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Anna Orrnert and Tom Hewitt
1 
 
Introduction 
Exploring elites and their relations to institutions can assist understanding the day-to-day 
realities of politics in Africa (Chabal and Daloz 1999, Amundsen 2001, Lindberg 2003). This 
review is a scoping exercise in what has been written on the subject in recent years. The 
main task of the review is to summarise current understandings of how elites work with and 
through political institutions in Africa. 
There is a huge literature in this subject area. We have tried to pick out a) that which is most 
pertinent and non-repetitive, and b) that which raises as many questions as it provides 
answers. On the whole we have focused on literature published in the last five to ten years 
and we have inclined towards the literature on Anglophone Africa. 
The review is presented as follows: Section 1 is an introduction to Africa’s recent political 
landscape and it introduces some of the major issues that appear in the literature. Section 2 
provides some working definitions of elites, institutions and democratisation as three of the 
recurring themes in the review. Section 3 reviews literature broadly on democratisation in 
Africa and specifically on elections and elites. Section 4 examines how political parties have 
evolved over the last 15 years. Section 5 reviews the three branches of government and 
Section 6 briefly examines decentralisation and its relation to elites and politics. The 
remaining sections of the review move outside the more formal political structures to examine 
the media (Section 7), civil society (Section 8), women’s movements (Section 9), Trades 
unions (Section 10) and business associations (Section 11). The final Section 12 pulls out a 
number of gaps in the research that we have identified in the course of the review. Section 13 
contains a complete bibliography of citations used in the review. 
It is crucial to remember that Africa’s experiences of democratisation are no more than 15 
years old, and many scholars have cautioned that it is still very early to draw any definite 
conclusions (Amundsen 2001; Randall and Svasand 2002).  
1.   Africa’s political landscape 
Interest in politics in Africa mushroomed following the wave of multiparty elections that began 
to sweep much of the continent during the 1990s. South Africa’s President Mbeki hailed this 
phenomenon a ‘political renaissance’ and the development community enthusiastically 
poured time, energy and resources into the electoral project to support this ‘third wave’ of 
democratisation
2. At first glance, it seemed that the 1990s brought significant changes to 
Africa’s political landscape. As Nicholas van de Walle points out: 
“Between 1989 and the end of 2000, sub-Saharan Africa witnessed 70 presidential elections (spread across 
most of the region’s 48 countries) involving more than one candidate. Over the same period, legislative 
elections involving at least two parties were held at least once in 42 countries—an average of more than 
seven elections a year. By the late 1990s, national legislatures in 39 of the 48 sub-Saharan countries 
contained representatives from at least two political parties. Only Congo- Kinshasa, Eritrea, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Swaziland, and Uganda held no multiparty elections whatsoever.” (van de Walle 2002).  
By the mid-1990s, however, much of the initial euphoria surrounding elections in Africa began 
to dissipate. While some countries seemed to have made ‘substantial democratic progress’, 
others clearly had not (van de Walle, 2002). In many African countries, the first fledgling steps 
of democracy faltered. Despite the institutionalisation of multi-party elections, some concluded 
that the ‘third wave’ of democratisation was in fact not very deep (Gibson and Hoffman 2002). 
                                                       
1  We wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Nicolas van de Walle, Cornell University, at all stages of the 
review. We also thank Claire Mcloughlin, GSDRC, for important suggestions and editing, and John Spall, GSDRC, for 
assistance in translation. 
2 The coining of this phrase is attributed to Samuel Huntington, who in 1991 observed that transitions from non-
democratic to democratic regimes occur in waves.   4
15 years later, the verdict on the democratisation of politics in Africa is equally contested. 
Burning questions remain for analysts: Have multi-party elections resulted in any fundamental 
changes in the African political context? If not, why not? What happens next? Crudely 
speaking, the experience of the 1990s pushed analysts into two opposing categories: the 
optimists (van de Walle, Butler, Barkan) and the pessimists (Diamond, Lawson, van 
Walraven, Haynes). The optimists emphasise that democratisation in Africa is still very young, 
and that positive changes are taking place, albeit slowly. Pessimists, on the other hand, argue 
that democratisation is being undermined by several inherent characteristics within the 
African system, including personal rule and clientelism. Despite these differences in 
perspectives, several common themes emerge in the literature relating to the current African 
political context. These are explored briefly below. 
Diversity of ‘Africa’ 
Sweeping generalisations about the political landscape in Africa ignore the reality that African 
countries are diverse both in terms of their historical experience and local context. At the 
same time as multiparty elections were being set up in Benin, Ghana and Zambia, other 
countries on the continent – for example Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Rwanda - 
plunged into disorder and violent conflict. Even the more peaceful countries showing evidence 
of democratisation cannot be assumed to be a homogenous group, or even to have similar 
characteristics. There are further problems with making generalisations, such as using the 
label ‘democracy’. Amundsen stresses that the fundamental problem in defining democracy is 
how to identify the minimum criteria employable (and at what cost) to distinguish between 
‘democratic’ and ‘non-democratic’ countries. Regime type and level of democracy cannot be 
measured directly in numerical terms because they simultaneously embrace many different 
elements. Consequently, ‘the more variables we bring in, the more each African country will 
stand out as a category of its own’ (Amundsen 2001, p.48).  Importantly however, the 
diversity among African countries does not preclude useful cross-country analysis (van de 
Walle, Chabal and Daloz 1999).  
Elections do not mean democracy 
The past 15 years have revealed that multi-party politics in Africa does not on its own 
guarantee democracy (Amundsen 2001). Chabal and Daloz point out that despite the advent 
of multiparty elections, Africa’s leaders have not significantly changed during this period. In 
several instances since 1990, for example, ‘the former African ‘dictators’… [have been]…re-
elected in recognizably ‘free and fair’ multi-party elections’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p.32). 
Chabal and Daloz argue that this limited changeover signifies that the very notion of 
leadership in Africa is synonymous with access to resources as a source of credibility. In 
other words, it is indicative of the fact that clientelism, or ‘the exchange or brokerage of 
specific services and resources for political support in the form of votes’ (Erdmann and Engel 
2006), has become the informal style of politics practiced in much of Africa. The very notion of 
‘representation’ in Africa is anchored in informal patronage networks, and arguably people 
vote because: 
“they are expected, or ‘asked’, to do so, or perhaps because it is indispensable to be seen to be voting a 
certain way. On the whole, they do not vote because they support the ideas of a particular political party but 
because they must placate the demands of their existing or putative patron” (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p.39). 
Tripp argues that it is because democracy in Africa has not moved beyond the Western notion 
of holding elections that ‘the patterns of neopatrimonial rule, personal rule, and state-based 
clientelism remain in tact and are simply manifesting themselves in a multiparty context’ 
(Tripp, 2001, p.212).  
Presidentialism  
Because power in most African countries is weakly institutionalised, the fundamental rules of 
the game have changed very little despite the advent of multi-party elections (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999). Today, the majority of African countries operate presidential rather than 
parliamentary systems. Partial exceptions to full presidentialism include Angola, Namibia and 
Equatorial Guinea (semi-presidential regimes), Swaziland (absolute monarchy), Lesotho   5
(parliamentary constitutional monarchy), Ethiopia and Mauritius (parliamentary regimes) and 
Mauritania (military dictatorship) (Resnick n.d.). In reality though, many of these exceptions 
exhibit the same traits as presidential systems and the more important measure is how 
accountable a regime is to its citizens. According to Resnick, presidentialism can ‘result in the 
personalisation of power because the executive derives legitimacy from voters rather than 
from gaining the confidence of the legislature’. (Resnick, n.d., p.14). In other words, 
leadership is structured around personalised, particularistic networks, rather than formal 
legislation. In this regard, presidential regimes have undermined democratisation on the 
African continent.  
Ethnicity 
Often, the single most important factor (superseding programmatic and/or ideological factors) 
that enforces loyalty to an individual or party in Africa is ethnicity. Ethnic mobilisation 
underpins both political interaction and conflict across the continent. Politicians have a strong 
incentive to maintain the support of their own lineage or ethnic group (van de Walle, 2003b). 
In order to secure their support base: 
“politicians need not only to promise to favour some distinct category of voters, but also to establish greater 
credibility among this category of voters than other politicians. A strategy of distributing favours equally 
across individuals from all ethnic categories does not give any candidate a competitive advantage” (Chandra, 
2006). 
The salience of ethnicity in Africa also has important implications for economic development, 
inequality and social stratification.
3 It is argued, for example, that Africa is more unequal today 
than it was 30 years ago (Milanovic 2005). Milanovic proposes that such high inequality is 
‘principally a political phenomenon’ (p.3) and concludes that politics ‘works through ethnicity 
(and religion)’ (p.34). Ethnic fragmentation has therefore had a profound impact on all aspects 
of life in Africa.
4 
Personal rule and patronage 
In states without effective institutions, formal rules are openly defied and ignored, so while 
formal institutions exist on paper in Africa, they do not shape the conduct of individual actors 
(Hyden 2006). Chabal and Daloz argue that ‘the state in Africa was never properly 
institutionalised because it was never significantly emancipated from society.’ This was partly 
due to historical and cultural reasons, but it primarily resulted from the informalisation of 
politics. The ‘emancipation of the state… rests on the establishment and operation of a civil 
service unconstrained by the dynamics of social pressures’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p.5). 
This means the public and private spheres become functionally distinct, and appointment and 
advancement are based on meritocracy. Yet in much of Africa, power remains personalised 
and based on informal relations, and ‘the legitimacy of African political elites derives from their 
ability to nourish the clientele on which their power rests’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p.15). In 
order to legitimise themselves and secure a broad support base (which is built on practices of 
redistribution), the political leadership in Africa controls access to resources that others need 
but cannot get on their own (Hyden 2006).  
This clientelist system is in many cases understood to be built upon the capture and control of 
state resources. In presidential systems, this means access to state resources is also highly 
concentrated in the presidency (van de Walle 2001, van de Walle 2003, Chabal and Daloz 
1999, Hyden 2006). Chandra argues that ‘a democracy will not be patronage-based if the 
private sector is larger than the public sector as a source of jobs and provider of services, or if 
those who control the distribution of state resources and services cannot exercise discretion 
in the implementation of policy concerning their distribution’ (Chandra, 2006). Neopatrimonial 
regimes are substantially weakened when their rulers become unable to distribute sufficient 
patronage, and economic crises can therefore present significant crises of legitimacy for 
                                                       
3  These are aspects that we have been unable to explore in any detail in this review.  
4  There is little research in this area and it merits attention. See also Gelb (2001) and Nkurunziza and Ngaruko 
(2002) on Burundi who come to similar conclusions.   6
African neopatrimonial rulers (Gibson and Hoffman 2002). While the greatest threat to the 
survival of patrimonialism is the disappearance of state resources, analysts have suggested 
that this threat only affects the party or individual in power - patrimonialism as a system will 
survive in tact (Chabal and Daloz 1999, Randall and Svasand 2002b). On the other hand, 
Hyden also points out that there are African rulers who have remained in power, and carried 
out their jobs effectively, without the extensive use of public resources (Hyden 2006). 
Given the pervasiveness of personal rule in Africa, the pressure from the international 
community to undertake democratic reform has resulted in ‘partial reform syndrome’, whereby 
leaders commit rhetorically to reform, but only carry it out to the extent that it does not hurt 
politically important individuals among the political elite (Kjaer 2004). Indeed in many cases, 
neopatrimonialism has become the norm, implying ‘a mixture of… patrimonial and legal-
rational bureaucratic domination’ (Erdmann and Engel 2006)
5. Some analysts further argue 
that informal, de facto traditions and practices are evolving to adapt to new circumstances. It 
is important to acknowledge that patronage politics exists in many democratic systems that 
are deemed legitimate – for example, the powerful lobbies that wield influence over Congress 
in the United States. It is therefore possible to understand democratisation as a mechanism 
for reducing the illegality of neopatrimonial relations (and instituting a more codified system of 
patronage), rather than a complete reversal of them (van de Walle). 
The degree and nature of neopatrimonialism vary enormously between African countries, 
although understanding this differentiation and the context-specific characteristics of 
neopatrimonialism appear to be under-researched areas. It has been hypothesised that the 
incarnation of neopatrimonial regimes will vary across different regime types (Gibson and 
Hoffman 2002), although this is also an under-researched area. Amundsen suggests that 
future research ought to focus on a narrower and more precise delineation and evaluation of 
the core aspects of neopatrimonialism in different contexts (Amundsen 2001). He also argues 
that distinguishing ‘neopatrimonial’ factors from other relevant factors (such as the existing 
international aid regime and terms of trade), and analysing the relationship between these, 
will be key to any real understanding of the political landscape in Africa (Amundsen 2001). 
2. Definitions 
Elites 
Elites are the most powerful people within any national political system. They can number 
very few, especially in small countries (perhaps 800-1000 in Benin or Malawi). Larger and 
more urban countries (for example Nigeria or South Africa) have more. Nevertheless, in all 
cases elites make up a small portion of the population - perhaps 3-4% at most (Hossain and 
Moore 2002). Elites can be broadly characterised as: 
 “the people who make or shape the main political and economic decisions: ministers and legislators; owners 
and controllers of TV and radio stations and major business enterprises and activities; large property owners; 
upper-level public servants; senior members of the armed forces, police and intelligence services; editors of 
major newspapers; publicly prominent intellectuals, lawyers and doctors; and – more variably – influential 
socialites and heads of large trades unions, religious establishments and movements, universities and 
development NGOs … In most developing countries, governing elites tend to be especially powerful. They 
often command a particularly large slice of the national income, and the influence that goes with it.” (Hossain 
and Moore 2002) 
Daloz argues against a simplistic dichotomy of a modernising elite opposed to the backward 
and irrational masses and makes the important argument that elites in Africa are actually 
enmeshed in vertical cleavages, communal or faction-based, and have to maintain vertical 
networks of subordinates who exert a kind of continuous blackmail on the elites. These 
networks are maintained through an informal and constantly renegotiable logic (Daloz 1999). 
                                                       
5 Erdmann and Engel provide a useful review of the literature and definitions around neopatrimonialism, arguing that 
analysts and Africanists tend to use the term in a variety of ways. Please see Erdmann, G. and Engel, U., 2006, 
‘Neopatrimonialism Revisited  - Beyond a Catch-All Concept’, GIGA Working Paper, German Institute of Global and 
Area Studies   7
In Africa, elites have invariably been associated with the formal political institutions of the 
state. As Chandra notes, those who have the capital to launch a political career tend to be 
‘elites’; i.e. upwardly mobile middle class individuals, better educated and better off than the 
voters whom they seek to mobilise. She notably uses the term ‘elite’ interchangeably with the 
terms ‘politician’, ‘candidate’, ‘incumbent’, and ‘entrepreneur’ (Chandra 2006). We should note 
here, however, that the term ‘elites’ is (often) used differently from the term ‘middle classes’. 
The latter is frequently employed to describe the people engaged in business activity - an 
entrepreneurial class, a branch of the elite but distinguished, for example, from the ‘political 
elite’.
6 This middle class is actually often absent in African countries – it is the missing middle 
that donors were keen to promote in the era of structural adjustment. Sklar (Sklar 2000) 
discusses the lack of an ‘autonomous bourgeoisie’ in many post-colonial African countries. 
Where a middle class is developing, he describes important differences, for example between 
northern (traditional) and southern (more modern) Nigeria, or in Ethiopia where a middle class 
developed within a ‘feudal-type framework’, or in East Africa where Asians held important 
economic positions (along with Europeans) until processes of ‘Africanisation’ were put in 
place. 
The important point is that elites are not a homogenous block; they are divided by ethnicity, 
functionality, politics and economics. At the same time, an important characteristic of elites in 
Africa since decolonisation is that both politics and economics have been almost entirely 
linked to the state. Elites have, therefore, developed within (or in close proximity to) the state.  
Political institutions 
Institutions are broadly the framework of rules, habits, customs and routines (both formal and 
written, or, more often, informal and internalised) that govern society at large. 
Douglas North defines institutions as: 
"The humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints 
(rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions, and self imposed codes of 
conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies and 
specifically economies." (North, D., 1993, ‘Economic Performance through Time’, Lecture to the memory of 
Alfred Nobel, December 9) 
Institutions and organisations are often conflated. For the purpose of this review, we see 
organisations as bodies or actors that get things done, and institutions as the framework in 
which that doing occurs. There is of course considerable overlap between the two: 
Organisations can become institutions (can be ‘institutionalised’) whereby they come to 
embody important social norms and values (think of the World Bank or the United Nations).  
Similarly, the distinction between formal and informal institutions is ‘fuzzy’. Informal norms 
and behaviours permeate even the most formal of institutions. We refer to formal institutions 
as the rules that govern the different organisational components of political life, such as: 
political parties, bureaucracies, electoral processes, the branches of government (executive, 
legislative and judiciary), constitutions, trades unions, business groups and civil society 
organisations.
7 These, of course, are subject to both the formal and informal constraints 
identified by North above. Informal institutions are more ambiguous, but Hyden’s  definition is 
useful here: “[institutions are] an inter-personal trust that is more immediate and exclusively 
reliant on unwritten rules in use” (Hyden 2006). 
Several authors have highlighted the importance of looking at both formal and informal 
institutions. Lund argues that “while government institutions are important, the state qualities 
of governance – that is, being able to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on 
                                                       
6 For the case of Ghana, see (Luckham et al. 2005). Here they distinguish four kinds of ‘middle class’ group: the 
entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, professionals and other independent educated groups, state elites, and middle class 
members of Ghana’s diaspora community (p. 3). 
7 This list is extendable since it could include customs services, the police, extension agencies and such like. In 
addition, there are local institutions – considerably less researched in Africa than national or urban institutions – 
would include local government and administration, local justice systems, social networks, property rights and land 
tenure arrangements, local heads/chiefs, community-based organisations, and so on.   8
members of society – are not exclusively nested in these institutions. A wider variety of 
institutions are at play in this enterprise” (Lund 2006b). 
Democratisation 
A practical definition of democracy is: “a form of political regime in which citizens choose, in 
competitive elections, the occupants of the top political offices of the state” (Bratton and Van 
de Walle 1997).
8 These attributes can be found in Dahl’s notion of polyarchy: 1) elected 
officials; 2) free and fair elections; 3) inclusive suffrage; 4) the right to run for office; 5) 
freedom of expression; 6) alternative information; and 7) associational autonomy (Dahl 1989). 
Such a formulation is frequently used as the basis for discussions of democracy and about 
whether or to what extent a particular country or region is democratic. From this has 
burgeoned a substantial literature from which we can derive important indicators about 
research methods, research needs and policy formulation. 
One important aspect of the debate on research methods in political science concerns 
definitions of democracy. Put another way, it is: “the twofold challenge [of] increasing analytic 
differentiation in order to adequately characterise the diverse regimes that have emerged in 
recent years and maintaining conceptual validity by avoiding conceptual stretching” (Collier 
and Levitsky 1997). In the case of research in African countries, the dilemma of “democracy 
with adjectives” has become quite acute. On the one hand, it is evident that the orthodox 
understanding of liberal democracy is only partially applicable in the case of many African 
countries. On the other, the explosion of adjectives to describe different regime types has put 
the notion and validity of comparative politics under strain. For example, terms to describe 
political elites’ attempts to look after their interests include the state as ‘kleptocratic’, 
‘predatory’, ‘pirate’ and ‘vampire’ (Thompson). Another set of qualifiers describe the 
institutional condition of states; states that are ‘failed’, ‘collapsed’, ‘fragile’, ‘minimally 
institutionalised’, ‘institutionalised but non-competitive’ (Grindle 2004), and so on. Political 
regimes are fluid, de-stabilised, stable (Lindberg) or free, partly-free, not free (Freedom 
House), or Gunther and Diamonds classification of political parties.
9  
There is much overlap in these terms and clearly it is essential to make such distinctions if a 
nuanced understanding is to be gained. Researchers need to bear in mind what is being 
compared to what in order to avoid the danger of misrepresentation. 
3.  Democratisation and elites 
The literature on democratisation in Africa since the early 1990s addresses a variety of 
questions, many of which have so far yielded only partial or tentative answers. Questions 
concern the extent of democratisation, the nature of the electoral process and its outcomes, 
democratic consolidation, the nature of political parties, incumbents and oppositions, the 
changing role of branches of government and the civil service and the effects of 
decentralisation. Within these broad questions are others related to ethnicity, religion and 
local politics/elites.  
As noted in the introduction, most African countries in 1990 were neo-patrimonial, meaning 
that they were hyper-presidential, the principal political glue was clientelism, and clientelism 
was primarily about gaining access to state resources. Elites operated within the political 
system often using public office for private gain and for direct access to the resources of the 
state. The wave of elections from the early 1990s has produced optimists and pessimists for 
Africa’s democratic prospects: the optimists say that democracy can develop over time, that 
elites and political institutions will evolve to look more or less like in other places, that this 
process will be a gradual consolidation, and that clientelist relations will become more 
codified, less illegal (e.g. Schedler, Lindberg, van de Walle and others); the pessimists say 
                                                       
8 Such a definition, Bratton and van de Walle go on to say, does not depend on showing that contestants are ‘true’ 
democrats, nor does it presuppose the pre-existence of a political culture of democracy amongst elites or masses. 
9 They classify each of 15 `species' of party into its proper `genus' on the basis of three criteria: (1) the nature of the 
party's organization (thick/thin, elite-based or mass-based, etc.); (2) the programmatic orientation of the party 
(ideological, particularistic-clientele-oriented, etc.); and (3) tolerant and pluralistic (or democratic) versus proto-
hegemonic (or anti-system) (Gunther and Diamond 2003).   9
that the political process in Africa, the behaviour of its elites and their use of and interaction 
with institutions is different from established liberal democracies and will remain so for a long 
time to come (Chabal and Daloz 1998; Schatzberg 2001; Carothers 2002).
10 In reality these 
caricatures are not very useful, since there is some overlap of views between the two camps, 
particularly in the more sophisticated versions. However, it is important to be aware of them 
since they have an important bearing on research, especially policy-oriented research.  
A number of key points about democracy and elites emerge from the democracy literature. 
These include: 
   Electoral politics should not be conflated with democracy; they can be seen as a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy. There are significant differences 
in the quality of democratic practice, in the level of economic activity, and in the quality 
of economic performance across the region in the last 20 years; 
   The democratic experience in Africa since 1990 is characterised by huge variation and 
diversity; 
   Ethnic variation, in particular, is a key variable in understanding politics, elite behaviour 
and democratisation; 
   The alternation of power through elections is a useful proxy measure of levels of 
democratisation and the behaviour of elites. 
Elections 
Multi-party elections are now ubiquitous in the region. Democracy is not. Most of Africa has 
practiced electoral politics since the mid 1990s. Only a handful of states have really 
introduced meaningful systems of democratic competition and participation.  The others are 
doing what Diamond (Diamond 2002) and Schedler (Schedler 2002a; Schedler 2002b) call 
“electoral authoritarianism” or “electoral autocracy”. The wave of elections in the 1990s 
seemed to signal a significant change in Africa’s political landscape, but it is increasingly 
evident that some countries “have made substantial democratic progress, while others have 
not” (van de Walle 2002). 
Table 1 shows indicators of political rights and civil liberties as calculated by Freedom House 
as well as those African countries considered as ‘electoral democracies’ in 2006. This 
contrasts with the situation 30 years ago. In 1976, three countries were considered ‘free’, 
compared to 11 in 2006. A further 16 were considered ‘partly free’ in 1976, compared to 23 in 
2006. The number of countries considered ‘not free’ has declined from 25 to 14 in the same 
period.
11 It is significant that the flurry of electoral activities in the period 1990-95 was the high 
point in this partial improvement in the Freedom House indicators.
12 
The final column in the table shows the direction of change for 2006 in comparison to the 
country scores in 1990. All but three of the 38 ‘free’ and ‘partly free’ countries have improved 
on their Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores – albeit some only marginally 
so. Only two of the ‘not free’ countries scored minor improvement in the same period, whilst 
scores for the remaining 11 (excluding Eritrea) were unchanged or declined. The message is 
clear. The non-performers are in a deep hole. The majority, however (and despite variations), 
are moving in one and the same direction. For many of these countries, including several of 
those considered ‘free’, reversals are quite likely. Indeed in these 15 years several countries 
have swung quite significantly from the trend (for example Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone and Zambia). Nonetheless, the trend remains.  
 
 
                                                       
10 Also see (Joseph 2003) as an example of the pessimistic strand of this camp. 
11 Put the other way, nearly 30 per cent of countries in sub-Saharan Africa are ‘not free’ in 2006. 
12 Freedom House, 2006, ‘Freedom in Africa Today’. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/36.pdf#search=%22freedom%20in%20Africa%20today%22 
Accessed 5.10.06.   10
Table 1: Indicators of Political Rights and Civil Liberties in Africa - 2006
13 
Country Political  Rights  Civil  Liberties  Status 
Change from 
1990 
Cape Verde*   1  1  Free  + 
Mauritius* 1  1  Free  + 
South Africa*  1  2  Free  + 
Ghana* 1  2  Free  + 
Benin*   2  2  Free  + 
Botswana*   2  2  Free  - 
Mali* 2  2  Free  + 
São Tomé & Príncipe*  2  2  Free  + 
Namibia* 2  2  Free  + 
Lesotho* 2  3  Free  + 
Senegal* 2  3  Free  + 
Kenya* 3  3  Partly  Free  + 
Madagascar* 3  3  Partly  Free  + 
Niger* 3  3  Partly  Free  + 
Seychelles* 3  3  Partly  Free  + 
Mozambique* 3  4  Partly  Free  + 
Guinea-Bissau 3  4  Partly  Free  + 
Burundi*   3  5  Partly Free  + 
Sierra Leone*  4  3  Partly Free  + 
Tanzania 4  3  Partly  Free  + 
Comoros*   4  4  Partly Free  + 
Malawi* 4  4  Partly  Free  + 
Nigeria* 4  4  Partly  Free  + 
Zambia 4  4  Partly  Free  + 
Liberia* 4  4  Partly  Free  + 
Burkina Faso   5  3  Partly Free  + 
Uganda 5  4  Partly  Free  + 
Central African Rep.*  5  4  Partly Free  + 
The Gambia  5  4  Partly Free  - 
Djibouti   5  5  Partly Free  + 
Ethiopia 5  5  Partly  Free  + 
Congo-Brazzaville 5  5  Partly  Free  + 
Mauritania 6  4  Partly  Free  + 
Gabon 6  4  Partly  Free  No change 
Angola   6  5  Not Free  + 
Chad   6  5  Not Free  + 
Guinea 6  5  Not  Free  No change 
Rwanda 6  5  Not  Free  No change 
Togo 6  5  Not  Free  No change 
Cameroon   6  6  Not Free  No change 
                                                       
13 Countries marked with * are designated as ”Electoral Democracies” by Freedom House. Criteria for designation 
as an Electoral Democracy: 1. A competitive, multiparty political system; 2. Universal adult suffrage for all citizens 
(with exceptions for restrictions that states may legitimately place on citizens as sanctions for criminal offences); 3. 
Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and the absence 
of massive voter fraud that yields results that are unrepresentative of the public will; 4. Significant public access of 
major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning   11
Congo-Kinshasa 6  6  Not  Free  No change 
Côte d'Ivoire   6  6  Not Free  No change 
Somalia 6  7  Not  Free  - 
Swaziland 7  5  Not  Free  - 
Equatorial Guinea  7  6  Not Free  - 
Eritrea 7  6  Not  Free   
Zimbabwe 7  6  Not  Free  - 
Sudan 7  7  Not  Free  No change 
Source: (Freedom House 2006) 
Table 1 shows the preponderance of ‘partly free’ countries in Africa. What does this mean? It 
is a confirmation that the democratic process in Africa is not at a point recognised in the 
orthodox sense. However, the situation can be interpreted in a number of ways. 
By the mid-1990s, there was a growing scepticism that the wave of democratisation was not 
all that it had been expected to be. One World Bank observer identified eight causes for this 
scepticism: the weakness of political parties; manipulation of the electoral process; a narrow 
political field; a constrained civil society; a controlled press; the absence of “civility”; privatised 
violence and politicised armies; and international support for dictatorship (particularly in 
Francophone Africa) (Monga 1997). Is that the whole story? A decade later the jury is still out.  
Some studies give us a better picture of the routes that democratisation is taking. The 
literature takes us in two directions: 
One side of this argument is that it is no longer useful to talk about transition to democracy; 
the optimism of the early 1990s was misplaced. Carothers’ (Carothers 2002) work is 
important here because of its research and policy implications. He argues against the simple 
optimism of agencies such as USAID that assume: 1) a move away from authoritarianism 
naturally means a move toward democracy, 2) democratisation happens in stages – of 
opening, breakthrough, and consolidation – in some inevitable way, 3) whilst elections are not 
equal to democracy, they are deemed to be most significant in and of themselves, 4) 
underlying conditions will not be major factors at the onset or the outcome of the transition 
process,
14 and 5) democratic transitions are build on coherent functioning states (Carothers 
2002). The ‘partly free’ and arguably some of the ‘free’ countries listed by Freedom House 
above fall into what Carothers calls a ‘grey zone’
15 where there are some democratic 
attributes but ”they suffer from serious democratic deficits.”
16 Those countries in the middle 
two columns of Table 2, for example, would fall in the grey zone. 
Table 2. Categorization of African Political Regimes in 2006 
Consolidating 
Democracies  
Democratises   Semi-Authoritarians   Autocratic 
Benin   Comoros   Angola   Cameroon 
Botswana   Kenya   Burkina Faso   Chad 
Cape Verde   Lesotho   Burundi   Dem. Rep. of Congo 
Ghana   Liberia   Central African Rep.   Equatorial Guinea 
Mali   Madagascar   Congo   Eritrea 
Mauritius   Malawi   Cote d’Ivoire   Gabon 
Namibia   Mozambique   Djibouti   Guinea 
Sao Tome & Principe   Niger   Ethiopia   Mauritania 
Senegal   Nigeria   Gambia   Somalia* 
South Africa   Seychelles   Guinea Bissau   Sudan 
  Sierra Leone   Rwanda   Swaziland 
  Tanzania   Togo   Zimbabwe 
 Uganda    
 Zambia    
Source: (Siegle 2006)  * Somalia is still largely ungoverned, though best classified as autocratic. 
                                                       
14 “All that seemed to be necessary for democratisation was a decision by a country’s political elites to move toward 
democracy and an ability on the part of those elites to fend off the contrary actions of remaining antidemocratic 
forces” (Carothers 2002) 
15 Or what Shedler (Shedler 2002) calls ‘the foggy zone’ of which more below. 
16 Including poor representation of citizen interests, low levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse 
of law by officials, and so on.   12
Trying to get to grips with what these kinds of democracies could be labelled led to what has 
been described “democracy with adjectives” (Collier and Levitsky 1997). Carothers, in an 
attempt to simplify the plethora of democratic descriptors, identifies two strands of political 
syndrome: ‘feckless pluralism’ where participation remains shallow and troubled and political 
elites (from all parties) are perceived as being corrupt, self-interested and ineffective
17 and 
‘dominant power politics’ where there may be ‘limited but still real political space, “yet one 
political grouping … dominates the system in such a way as there appears to be little 
prospect of alternation in power in the foreseeable future” (Carothers 2002). A major political 
problem in this situation is “the blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party … 
[where] … the state’s main assets … are gradually put in the direct service of the ruling party” 
(p.12). This situation was prevalent (at the time the article was published) in many countries in 
Africa, for example, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, Gabon, Kenya 
and Mauritania.
18 
The other side of the argument is that whilst incomplete and compromised, some positive 
democratic outcomes or trends can be identified in some of the electoral experiences of 
Africa. Staffan Lindberg has published widely on this. He has argued that elections in Africa 
have had positive impacts on democracy (as measured by improvements in civil liberties) 
(Lindberg 2006) and that the very process of holding elections has been self-reinforcing of 
democracy (Lindberg 2004).
19 The regimes falling in the ‘partly free’ Freedom House category 
have been identified as falling somewhere in the range of electoral democracy and electoral 
autocracy identified by Schedler (Schedler 2002b; Schedler 2002a).
20 Pessimists might argue 
that such a distinction is splitting hairs and both types of electoral system are proof that 
democracy is blocked in Africa. A more optimistic approach argues that ‘alternation of power’ 
shows a move towards electoral democracy.
21 Alternation of power can be defined as a 
‘tipping game’ (van de Walle 2005) – whereby the ‘growing probability’ of alternation of power 
(due to a number of interrelated factors) causes cohesion amongst opposition parties. But 
little by little (and with frequent backward steps) alternation of power can fortify democratic 
expectations. Such a ‘tipping’ process is more likely to take place in situations where it is 
difficult to distinguish between political platforms – typically the case in African countries – 
such that relationships between parties are very fluid. Another source of fluidity is from 
electoral fraud and elite deal making that incumbents frequently employ (van de Walle 2005). 
Schedler's concept of "nested democratisation" is useful here. His argument is that in 
electoral autocracies, electoral competition is “nested” within a broader competition to 
redefine the rules. The broader game is a progressive process of democratisation. Autocrats 
can win in the short run, but with every election they are legitimating the mechanisms to push 
themselves out of power. Even so, it is very important to distinguish these electoral 
autocracies from democracies. One key way to do this, as noted above, is to focus on 
alternation. Where alternation has occurred there is likely to be both more democracy and a 
greater likelihood that new elites are emerging (Schedler 2002b). 
Another trend, finally, indicates the relationship between GDP per capita and political regime 
in Africa from 1960 to 1997 (with the categories based on the situation in 1988). In aggregate, 
it is countries with multi party systems (5 countries) that have a higher and growing GDP per 
capita. Those with one-party systems (23 countries) and military oligarchies (9 countries) 
have shown a much smaller rise in income in the period. Causality cannot be established 
from the graph, only the correlation.  
                                                       
17 Feckless pluralism is prevalent in Latin America, Carothers argues, but instances in Africa are also found. 
Carothers includes Madagascar, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone. 
18 This leads us again to the notion of neo-patrimonialism amply described and analysed in (Bratton and Van de 
Walle 1994). 
19 Such findings do not imply that clientelistic behaviours are not still common as illustrated in his study of Ghana 
(Lindberg 2003). 
20 And following (Diamond 2002). 
21 In Zambia, for example, there was alternation. It is more democratic than Cameroon where there has been no 
alternation of power. Where a dictator is still in power there is no democracy, e.g. Togo, Ivory Coast, Chad, CAR 
(Ghana under Rawlings was an exception to this).   13
Figure 1 
 
Source: (Ndulu and O'Connell 1999) based on data from (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997) 
Elites and elections 
The following questions arise with the onset of Multi-party elections evoke questions about 
how elites are changing or adapting: Are new elites emerging? Is there a deepening of elites 
(to include, for example, other ethnic groups, or women, or the private sector, etc)? What 
impact does ethnic heterogeneity have on elites? Are there elite linkages across institutions? 
Orthodox political science says that liberal democracy works best with a strong middle class 
that plays its part in keeping the state and its political elites accountable. This is frequently 
through associational activity in civil society. Another literature identifies elites as the lynchpin 
in fostering a developmental state. For instance, Leftwich argues that: 
"first and foremost, all developmental states have been led by determined developmental elites, which have 
been relatively incorrupt… and fiercely nationalistic… no developmental state has exhibited the one-man 
'sultanism' of many African states. On the contrary, they have often been run by shifting coalitions of diverse 
interests and, as socio-economic change has occurred, all such states have experienced (sometimes severe) 
intra-elite poetical and policy conflict, often intensifying over time.” (Leftwich 2000).  
The elites to which Leftwich refers also had a relative degree of autonomy (along with the 
institutions that they commanded). A key point for African elites is that to date they have 
exhibited little autonomy from presidential ‘big men’ - a single point from where political and 
economic power emanates and therefore around which elites assemble. As has already been 
argued, in many African countries the state itself has been the locus of class formation and 
elite activity, thus reducing the ability of society to hold the state in check. In what Chandra 
(Chandra 2006) calls patronage democracies,
22 this “produces an overwhelming 
preoccupation with politics on the part of both elites and voters seeking both material and 
psychic goods … in patronage democracies, obtaining control of the state is the principal 
means of obtaining both a better livelihood and higher status” (p. 9).
23  
The degree of ethnic variation is critical in determining the strategies deployed by elites. As 
Posner points out: 
“ African voters seek to maximize the amount of resources they can secure from the state and that politicians, 
knowing this, seek to attract and maintain their political followings by promising resources to those who 
support them...voters believe that having a member of their own ethnic group in a position of power will 
increase their access to such resources. They discount the election promises made by candidates who are 
not their ethnic kin and find credible only those promises made by candidates who share their ethnic 
                                                       
22 “… democracies in which the state has a relative monopoly on jobs and services, and in which elected officials 
enjoy significant discretion in the implementation of laws allocating the jobs and services at the disposal of the state” 
(Chandra 2006) 
23 “…in sub-Saharan Africa it is always a question of exchange – a universe where gifts and counter-gifts, 
accumulation and redistribution are the spinal column of mechanisms of political legitimation. Even if there are some 
elite groups in Africa who organise themselves in a horizontal logic, these tend to be fragile, and the force of vertical 
links between “unequals” along familial, ethnic-regional, religious and clientelist lines are much stronger.” (Daloz 
1999).   14
background.  Both of these rather uncontroversial claims are supported by the vast literature on neo-
patrimonialism in Africa “ (Posner 2001). 
Such a situation has served political elites well in the past, as van de Walle argues: 
“it is more useful to think of clientelistic politics in Africa as constituting primarily a mechanism for 
accommodation and integration of a fairly narrow political elite rather than the logic of mass party patronage. 
Most of the material gains from clientelism are limited to this elite. The stronger link between political elites 
and the citizenry is through the less tangible bonds of ethnic identity.  Even in the absence of tangible 
benefits, citizens will choose to vote for individuals of their own ethnic group, particularly in ethnically divided 
societies. Less than the expectation that they will benefit directly from the vote, citizens may feel that only a 
member of their own ethnic group may end up defending the interests of the ethnic group as a whole, and 
that voting for a member of another ethnic group will certainly not do so” (van de Walle 2006). 
Elite politics are therefore different when ethno-regional differences are very politically salient 
(Cameroon or Nigeria) than in countries which may be ethnically diverse but in which ethnicity 
is not polarized  (Tanzania or Senegal), let alone when there is ethnic homogeneity (Lesotho 
or Botswana). The political process tends to be unstable with ethnic heterogeneity. Elites 
make claims on ethnic identity as a way of securing votes. As a result there continues to be 
an absence of programmatic debate around policy in elections and campaigns are conducted 
almost entirely on the basis of personal and ethno-regional support (van de Walle 2006). But 
this is not a straightforward process with predictable outcomes. The work of Posner for 
example, examines multiple possible ethnic “cleavages” and how they may be different in 
one-party and multi-party systems:
24 
“Although ordinarily lumped under the umbrella term ‘ethnic’, communal conflict can take many forms.  
Sometimes competition takes place along religious lines.  At other times, competing groups are distinguished 
from one another by language.  At still other times in-group/out-group distinctions are made on the basis of 
tribal affiliation, clan membership, geographic region of origin, or race.  Within a single country, each of these 
distinctions may serve, in different situations, as a potential axis of social differentiation and conflict” (Posner 
2001). 
There is much evidence that however Africa’s political elites have divided along ethnic lines, 
they have been predatory, unproductive and misusing surpluses (Douma 1999; Mbeki 2005)
25 
and have continued to do so within a context of electoral politics.  Even in situations hailed as 
successful, such as Uganda in the 1990s, political elites continued to misuse public resources 
(Mwenda and Tangri 2005). But there is variation. For example, the richer the country, the 
bigger the middle class - a bourgeoisie (more autonomous than elites) putting pressure on the 
system (for better roads, an end to the predatory state, and so on). A good example is Ghana, 
where the middle class has had some success in putting pressure on political elites (Luckham 
et al. 2005). Mali is a contrary example, where there is no such pressure.  
Less attention has been given to the potential for elites to play a part in changing old 
practices. The work of Houssain, Moore and associates (Hossain and Moore 2002; Reis and 
Moore 2005) on elite perceptions of poverty is interesting in this respect and there are 
important indications in their research for any future work on elites. Their cautious optimism 
about the potential for elites to want to engage in poverty reduction is refreshing in contrast to 
the widespread cynicism found in the literature. Their research is based on the work of Abram 
de Swaan, who explores the emergence of welfarism in Europe and the United States 
(Swaan 1988). The research questions generated by Swaan’s work included: would persisting 
poverty and inequality in less developed countries point to the absence of a social 
consciousness among elites? Would Southern elites exhibit the proto-sociological wisdom 
that earlier led their counterparts to support social policies? How do Southern elites position 
themselves vis-à-vis collective initiatives for social inclusion?  
                                                       
24  His argument is that “under conditions of multi-party competition, ethnic cleavages that define large blocks of 
people tend to emerge as the axis of political conflict, coalition-building and voting, whereas under conditions of one-
party political competition, ethnic cleavages that define smaller, more localized groups of people tend to play this 
role.  The salience of ethnicity per se may not change, but the salience of the particular dimension of ethnic cleavage 
that structures politics is transformed by the shift in regime type” (Posner 2001). 
25 Country examples of this line of arguing are, for example: Ethiopia (Abbink 2006), Madagascar (Marcus and 
Ratsimbaharison 2005), Uganda (Mwenda and Tangri 2005)   15
There is no hard evidence on whether Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are having any 
impact on the stronghold of political elites of Africa.  Some research indicates there is limited 
but widening participation in political processes. A comparative study of South Africa, Ghana 
and Uganda, found that that CSOs themselves reflect wider society cleavages, and are 
represented on the whole by elites. Robinson and Friedman argue that, “a small number of 
urban-based intermediaries led by middle class elites command a disproportionate share of 
foreign aid resources. Many of these organisations exert a limited influence on public policy 
and do not make an enduring contribution to democracy through their activities” (Robinson 
and Friedman 2005).  Some argue that this concentration of foreign aid around a relatively 
small number of elite intermediaries reflects a deliberate strategy of fostering a vision of 
democracy that is restricted to elite competition and representation (Hearn 1999; Robinson 
and Friedman 2005). They suggest that aid donors seek to fund CSOs to promote support for 
economic liberalism and counter more radical visions of democracy based on popular 
participation and redistribution.  
An alternative hypothesis is that democratisation tends to divide elites by pitching them in 
competitions for electoral support, and by changing the political logic from assembling as 
large a majority as possible (the logic of the old single party regimes), to legitimating rule by 
the smallest possible winning coalition. Crook (Crook 1997), for example, explores this 
argument in Cote d'Ivoire. One consequence may be that elites appeal to lower levels of 
ethnic identity in electoral competitions than they do in single party regimes, which can lead to 
an exacerbation of ethnic polarisation in new democracies (Posner 2005). This hypothesis 
requires further research. 
An important source of new elite participation in African politics is the rapid growth of women’s 
election to legislatures. For example, in Rwanda’s 2003 elections 39 women were elected to 
the Chamber of Deputies (out of a total of 80 members). In South Africa and Mozambique in 
2004, there was 32 percent representation by women in national legislatures. In 2005, the 
Seychelles, Namibia and Uganda had women in 24 percent of seats in parliament (Bauer and 
Britton 2006). Other countries in Africa have followed suit, often through a system of voluntary 
or mandatory quotas (Kethusegile-Juru 2003).
26 Quotas have been introduced for a number 
of reasons, including pressure from domestic and international women’s movements, a 
diffusion of ideas across parties (if one adopts them so too do others to maintain a chance at 
the female vote), and to create new lines of patronage politics (as is argued for Uganda under 
Museveni) (Tripp 2003). Female political representation has happened in such a significant 
way due to specific conditions. The most significant advances for women have taken place 
where prolonged conflict has severely disrupted patterns of gender relations. Conflict appears 
to have acted as a training ground for a strong cadre of women. Women’s movements have 
also exerted direct pressure for change (Bauer and Britton 2006).
27 However, just as elections 
do not automatically correlate with democracy, the election of greater numbers of women to 
parliaments is not an automatic formula for new elites to exert influence. In the case of 
Uganda, for example, the political value of specially created new seats for women “has been 
eroded by their exploitation as currency for the NRM's patronage system, undermining 
women's effectiveness as representatives of women's interests once in office. This is because 
the gate-keepers of access to reserved political space are not the women's movement, or 
even women voters, but Movement elites” (Goetz 2002).  
Some of the above literature on women parliamentarians alludes to outcomes rather to 
electoral processes, for example in the formulation of legislation that directly addresses 
women’s issues like reproductive health, violence against women, women’s economic status, 
and so on. However, there is surprisingly little literature in general that examines measurable 
outcomes of democratisation in general in Africa. An exception is the work of Stasavage 
(Stasavage 2005). He makes the hypothesis – and then goes on to confirm it statistically
28 – 
                                                       
26 Curiously, it appears that those countries that use proportional representation have a higher proportion of female 
representatives that those using majority systems. It is not clear whether this or quotas is the strongest determinant 
of how many women will be found in a legislature (Yoon 2001). 
27 A case study of how such factors were important in Namibia can be found in (Bauer 2004). 
28 Using a dataset on education spending for 40 countries from 1980-96.   16
that “contested elections may have prompted African governments to be more responsive to 
the demands of the rural groups that form the majority of citizens of nearly all African 
countries. Under authoritarian regimes, in contrast, rulers will need to be more responsive to 
urban groups” (p.344). Through examining spending on education, and in particular primary 
education, he shows that multiparty electoral competition has been associated with greater 
government spending on primary education. Whilst he indicates the need for further research, 
he speculates that electoral competition will have a bigger effect on education spending 
where electors do not vote primarily on ethno-regional lines (Stasavage 2005). 
4. Political  parties 
Political parties are quite a new phenomenon in a continent that has a long tradition of one-
party states. There is an interesting body of research on the ways that party systems have or 
have not become institutionalised. We will not discuss this set of literature in detail, but it is 
noted here for reference.
29  
The status of political parties at the end of the 1990s is well summed up thus: 
 “Parties that won founding elections are almost invariably still in power. Secondly, the typical emerging party 
system has consisted of a dominant party surrounded by a large number of small, unstable parties. Thirdly, 
party cleavages have been overwhelmingly ethno-linguistic in nature, while ideological and programmatic 
debates have been muted and rare” (van de Walle 2003). 
Gunther and Diamond’s classification of political parties is a useful background for 
understanding types of political party.
30 They identify five broad kinds of political party: elite-
based parties, mass-based parties, ethnicity-based parties, electoralist parties and movement 
parties (Gunther and Diamond 2003). Elite-based and ethnicity-based parties have continued 
to dominate Africa’s period of democratisation.  Sometimes this has taken quite extreme 
forms, with democratic trappings such as Uganda’s ‘no-party democracy’ (Carbone 2003; 
Carbone 2005). There are virtually no examples of the emergence of political parties in Africa 
that have, for example, a Christian democratic or a labour movement origin. In short, there is 
a distinct lack of programmatic political parties on the continent. In parallel, there has been a 
persistence of single party rule in some countries (either literally or through the return to 
power of the party that was dominant before multi-party elections were introduced). As a 
result, “political parties are regularly perceived to be a weak link in the chain of elements that 
together make for a democratic state, or even to have helped undermine democracy through 
the irresponsible and self-interested actions of their leaders” (Randall and Svasand 2002b). 
Such clientelism in political parties is the mechanism for integrating and accommodating a 
narrow political elite (van de Walle 2003). Political parties are, traditionally, the recruitment 
ground for leaders and elites and, historically, the sources for such recruitment have been 
from single-parties, from the military, and from the civil service (particularly in Francophone 
Africa). Whether such practices will continue with the growth in multi-party elections or 
whether we will witness a broadening of recruitment of elites from other spheres is a matter 
for future research.
31 
(Randall and Svasand 2002b) suggest a number of factors contributing to current party 
weakness (particularly opposition parties) that include contextual factors (cultural and 
economic conditions), micro-level explanations (the role of political elites), and institutional 
explanations (the structure of the state and its institutions) (p.38). However, as already noted 
in the section on elections, some authors are observing gradual change coinciding with 
successive multi-party elections including the alternation of power and a gradual consolidation 
                                                       
29 Recent output here includes: (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Randall and Svasand 2002b; Randall and Svasand 
2002a; Creevey, Ngomo and Vengroff 2005; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Manning 2005; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; 
Riedl 2005). 
30 They classify each of 15 `species' of party into its proper `genus' on the basis of three criteria: (1) the nature of the 
party's organization (thick/thin, elite-based or mass-based, etc.); (2) the programmatic orientation of the party 
(ideological, particularistic-clientele-oriented, etc.); and (3) tolerant and pluralistic (or democratic) versus proto-
hegemonic (or anti-system) (Gunther and Diamond 2003). 
31 Some small indications of change are evident. For example, Morgan Tsvangirai, opposition leader in Zimbabwe is 
from a trade union background, as was Zambia’s president from 1991-2002, Frederick Chiluba. Madagascar’s 
President Marc Ravalomanana has a very successful business background.   17
of democratic expectations on the part of voters (Schedler 2002b; van de Walle 2005; 
Lindberg 2006). Opposition parties are obviously important in such a process. Crook’s (Crook 
1997) analysis of the Cote d’Ivoire elections of 1990 and 1995 is an illustration of the 
difficulties that opposition parties face in new multi-party systems where the ruling party 
already enjoyed a distinct advantage of projecting its ‘national image’ whilst opposition parties 
disintegrated with accusations of ethno-regionalism and thereby lost any broader appeal. A 
similar story occurred in Kenya through the 1990s. Hence Lindberg’s conclusion that political 
parties, especially in opposition, are set to remain very ‘fluid’ for a long time to come 
(Lindberg 2007). 
Finally, one reason that political parties continue to be weak (whether incumbent or in 
opposition) is that people simply do not trust them. Corruption remains a widespread concern 
in Africa’s political landscape. Transparency International’s 2005 survey of corruption focused 
on political corruption. Eight African countries were included in the survey. Whilst the police 
were considered to be the most corrupt of national institutions, political parties and parliament 
came close behind. On a scale of one to five, Table 3 indicates people’s perceptions of the 
gravity of political corruption in national political institutions in eight African countries. 
Table 3 – National Institutions and Sectors, Corrupt or Clean? 
To what extent 
do you 
perceive the 
following 
sectors in this 
country/territory 
to be affected 
by corruption?     
(1: not at all 
corrupt, … 5: 
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Cameroon  3.9 3.3 4.7 4.3  4  3.7 4.4 3.7 2.9 3.6 2.7 3.6 3.6 2.5  2 
Ethiopia  3.6 3.2 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.2 2.7 3.6 2.5 2.4 
Ghana  4.1 3.1 4.7 3.8 3.7 3.2 4.2 2.9 3.1 3.5 3.7 3.1 2.3 2.5 2.2 
Kenya  3.7 3.8 4.1 3.6 3.4 2.9 3.7 3.2 2.3 2.5 3.2 3.7 2.5 2.3  2 
Nigeria  4.5 4.1 4.7 3.8 3.6 3.2 4.2  3  2.8 3.8 3.6 3.1 3.8 2.5 2.3 
Senegal  3.6 3.1 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.8 3.6 2.7 2.4 2.5  2  3.1 1.9 2.1 1.8 
South Africa  4  3.7  4  3.3 2.7  3  2.9  3  2.6 2.8 2.9 3.8 2.7 2.7 2.3 
Togo  3.6 3.5 3.9 3.9 3.4 3.3 4.2  3  3  2.9 3.1 3.6 3.5 2.2 2.1 
AFRICA - 
average  4.2 3.8 4.4 3.7 3.5 3.1  4  3  2.7 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 2.5 2.2 
Source: (Transparency International 2005) 
5. Branches  of  government 
In general, the more effective the states permanent institutions, the greater its capacity to 
discipline the patrimonial behaviour of its political elites and their efforts to alter the political 
rules to suit their own ends (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). This section looks at some of 
the evidence concerning changes in the branches of government in African states in recent 
years. 
The executive 
Presidentialism is still strong and all the post-1990 regimes in Africa except Botswana, 
Lesotho, Mauritius and South Africa. This is significant particularly in light of former British 
colonies that were nominally run on parliamentary systems. In the post-colonial period, the 
former colonies moved to presidential systems, and none have subsequently reverted. This is 
indicative of the endurance of neo-patrimonial rule and ‘big man’ politics, which leaves little 
room for debate amongst elites and few checks and balances on the executive.
32  
                                                       
32  And despite a popular perception amongst voters that parliamentary systems are preferable (Cho 2004).   18
“In Africa’s illiberal and presidential regimes, the main drama is about control of the presidency. Legislative 
elections and party competition have to be understood in the context of this broader drama. The president 
has an incentive to ensure a friendly majority in the legislature, although he typically enjoys considerable 
decree powers and does not need a stable majority to rule effectively” (van de Walle 2003). 
One important trend is however emerging: all of the electoral governments of Africa are 
moving toward placing a two term limit on executive office – significant on a continent that has 
seen some of the longest ‘serving’ presidents in the world. This one change has opened up 
the opportunity for legislatures to exercise increased checks and balances on autocratic 
presidents.  
New constitutions may also be making a difference. There is some indication in the literature 
that constitutions framed in the 1990s are curbing some of the power enjoyed by African 
executives. The old post-independence constitutions - illiberal documents that proscribed 
opposition parties, conferred permanent tenure on presidents, and ignored habeas corpus - 
have been jettisoned. Some of the new constitutions have quite innovative features. The 
federalism and ethnicised political parties of Ethiopia represent an effort to confront society's 
ethnic problems within a multiparty framework.
33 The consultative "councils of traditional 
rulers" (as in South Africa and Namibia) and "councils of elder statesmen" (as in Ghana and 
Benin) attempt to institutionalise the participation of key social forces and fill something like 
the role of an upper house in a bicameral parliament. New constitutional courts in Benin and 
South Africa are proving useful in countering crude majoritarianism and claims of executive 
privilege (Gyimah-Boadi 1998). 
In some cases (notably Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana), the processes of constitution-making or 
amending could not be sufficiently liberated from the grip of incumbent autocrats. In Zambia 
and Côte d'Ivoire most notoriously, the new constitutions featured special clauses designed to 
help incumbents retain power by keeping their opponents off the ballot. In the former case, 
the amendment was meant to bar former president Kenneth Kaunda (the strongest rival to 
President Frederick Chiluba), from contesting the next election. And in Côte d'Ivoire, Henri 
Konan-Bedie resorted to a similar manoeuvre to ward off a potential challenge from former 
premier Alassane Ouattara (Gyimah-Boadi 1998). 
The legislature 
Notwithstanding the enduring power of the executive in many African states, it is, for our 
purposes, important to look at the emerging influence of legislatures and judiciaries as 
sources of new elites and changing political practices. The role of the legislature, especially in 
presidential systems, is important in balancing executive power.
34 Bratton and de Walle note 
that African legislatures have historically been weak and either ravaged by ethnic 
fragmentation and personality driven factionalism (as in Congo), or stable but subservient - 
controlled by intimidation and clientelism (for example Mali, Niger, Malawi and Zambia). 
In the early 1990s, most African legislatures were virtually powerless. This situation continued 
even after some countries began to experience a multi-party democratisation process. The 
long hiatus caused by one-party presidentialism has left legislatures poorly developed as 
institutions. Few of them have been around long enough to accumulate much democratic 
capital.  
“They often lack the traditions of tolerance, give and take, respect for minority opinion, and the like that make 
it easier to deal with such perennial issues of representative government as how to reconcile loyalty to one's 
party with loyalty to one's constituents, nation, or conscience. Notwithstanding the resourcefulness of a few 
individual lawmakers, African parliaments are notoriously deficient in physical plant and equipment. MPs 
work out of cramped, poorly furnished offices (if they are lucky enough to have offices) with little or no 
secretarial support. Both the facilities and the skills necessary for public-policy research and analysis are 
                                                       
33 They may also be intended, as critics charge, to entrench Tigrean hegemony. 
34 Characteristics of legislatures include: collective bodies which represent the public via constituency services; 
passing legislation; policymaking; executive oversight; and political recruitment. Weak legislatures emphasized 
constituent services and passing legislation. African legislators have emphasized their constituent services as a key 
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strictly limited. So is money--a reflection of both the parlous state of many African economies and the desire 
of many African presidents to keep legislatures weak and subordinate. Low pay and scanty perquisites 
expose MPs to grave moral and political hazards” (Gyimah-Boadi 1998). 
As products of recent transitions, African parliaments have tended to be "negative coalitions" 
cobbled together to dislodge - or to entrench - incumbents. In many of Africa's liberalized 
autocracies, exercising parliament's oversight function, checking the executive and fostering 
transparency and accountability are daunting tasks indeed (Gyimah-Boadi 1998). But there 
are two things that indicate changes in some countries: greater strength and influence of 
opposition parties – discussed in Section 4 - and the potential (at least) for the emergence of 
new elites with ‘sharpened teeth’ in legislatures. 
Whilst there is relatively little written on contemporary legislatures in Africa,
35 an exception is 
the work of Barkan and colleagues (Barkan et al. 2004; Barkan 2005). Their research took 
place in four countries (Benin, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal)
36 in 2002. The countries were 
chosen on the assumption that the legislature would have more authority than in other African 
countries.
37 This assumption proved to be only partially correct. The study found a range of 
authority, from very weak (Senegal) to growing in strength (Kenya) with Benin and Ghana 
sitting somewhere between. They conclude that the legislature’s authority is largely about the 
incentive structure facing individual legislature members. This has three components: 
clientelist practices and weak political parties with no programmatic content; the formal rules 
of the political system; and the internal structure of the legislature and the resources, 
including remuneration, available to its members. This study has (at least) two interesting 
findings. Whilst the nature of clientelist politics is only likely to change slowly (a view echoed 
in other parts of this survey), the rules and the resources components are more changeable 
on a shorter timescale. However, this will only happen, it is argued, when there is a critical 
mass of reformers (as opposed to patronage seekers) (Barkan et al. 2004). The second 
finding concerns the individuals who comprise this emerging elite of reformers. They argue 
that the emergence of a stronger, urban civil society in the mid-1980s brought with it a new 
and younger political cohort demanding the end of authoritarian rule. This was particularly the 
case in those countries with larger cities and which supported a flow of educated elites to and 
from the West.
38 With the decline of complete authoritarian rule during the 1990s, there 
emerged a struggle between patronage seekers and a small number of reformers (Barkan et 
al. 2004).
39 The balance between them is a matter for research.
40 As is the relationship 
between them and a growing civil society. Finally, Barkan identifies seven variables that need 
to be taken into account the extent to which legislatures become institutions of countervailing 
power. This is useful checklist for any research on legislatures. They are (Barkan et al. 2004; 
Barkan 2005): 
   The pressures of patron/client politics 
   The formal rules of the legislature 
   The level of salaries 
   The collective resources and capacities of the legislature 
   The degree of near parity of seats between government and opposition 
                                                       
35 A book that was unavailable at the time of writing looks well worth consulting is (Salih 2006). Case studies of 
African legislatures include: (Baker 2000; Barkan 2005; O’Brien 2005; Wang 2005)  
36  The author is currently writing a book called ‘Emerging Legislatures in Africa’s Emerging Democracies’ that covers 
legislatures in 6 countries. 
37 Based on the frequency of multi-party elections and an alternation of power or at least on intense electoral 
competition. 
38 For example Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa. 
39  Barkan says: “What is different between reformers and non-reformers is also not education. Rather it is attitude 
and worldview. Reformers are almost invariably Internet users. They understand what is going on beyond the borders 
of their countries. They are curious about this, and thus they are more likely to be supportive of universal norms of 
what constitutes best practices, especially with respect to the legislature.” (Personal communication). 
40  Others argue much more for the continued recycling of elites. (Daloz 1999), for example, argues that there is a 
strong tendency for people to have been in power, if not since independence, then at least for a very long time. The 
‘new generation’ seem to be exceptional cases.   20
   The presence of a coalition of reformers (and even opportunists) to overcome the 
disincentives for collective action in (1) 
The rapid rise of female representation in some legislatures has had its own impact (for 
example Rwanda, South Africa, Seychelles, Uganda, and Tanzania that all have more than 
20 percent female representation in their single of lower houses). This impact has been felt, 
for example, through forcing parliaments to include gender concerns in discussions of land 
rights in the context of customary law or to recognise women’s economic role in poverty 
alleviation policies, or raising violence against women as a matter for public debate, and 
many other issues besides. Before women were represented in legislatures, such issues were 
not a matter for public policy (Bauer and Britton 2006). This is not automatic, however. In 
Uganda, despite the early promise of more female representatives, women’s policy issues 
have been blocked by other parliamentarians (Goetz 2002; Tripp 2006). 
The Judiciary 
Alongside the legislature, the judiciary checks the power of the executive by upholding the 
rule of law and the ensuring public accountability and transparency. The type of legal 
system
41 inherited at independence makes a difference. Through the use of proxy measures 
for rule of law based on Political Risk Services (ICRG) and Freedom House indicators, 
Joirman shows that “as a group, African common law systems have become more effective 
over time while the civil law systems have remained stagnant” (Joireman 2001). In addition, 
the common law countries show a distinct rise in rule of law indicators since the early 1990s - 
coinciding with the onset of electoral politics. Joireman also notes that this is an area requiring 
considerably more research before sophisticated conclusions can be reached.
42 
The judiciary has played an important role in Malawi’s electoral politics.
43 A paper by Gloppen 
and Kanyongolo (2004) shows how in the 2004 elections the judiciary was active in cases 
regarding; the electoral rules and framework for administration of the elections; the voter 
registration process; candidate selection; the electoral campaign; the polling process; the 
counting of votes and the integrity of the results, and cases regarding the distribution of 
positions and privileges on the basis of the election results. In this case, notwithstanding the 
many flaws in the election process, the judiciary acted in two important ways: firstly playing an 
accountability function (for example, by blocking self-serving changes in electoral rules); and 
secondly as a safety valve (for example, as arbiter in disputes over election results). 
However, the authors report that the judiciary itself became too political in the process - for 
example, acting as an internal arbiter for intra-party disputes or, more seriously, using its 
position to create political leverage for the parties and individual candidates (Gloppen and 
Kanyongolo 2004). In Kenya, the judiciary has been more seriously implicated in fraud. In 
2005, five out of nine Court of Appeal justices, 18 out of 36 High Court justices and 82 out of 
254 magistrates were implicated as corrupt in an investigation by the International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ 2005).
44  
6. Decentralisation 
The literature about elites, politics and decentralisation is sparse. This is despite a common 
understanding that decentralisation fosters democracy. It is argued that decentralisation 
brings government closer to the governed and, therefore, the government will be more 
responsive to its people. The World Bank exemplifies this view: 
“Political decentralization aims to give citizens or their elected representatives more power in public decision-
making. It is often associated with pluralistic politics and representative government, but it can also support 
                                                       
41 Common law and civil law. 
42 If ever there was a needful call for further research it is in this area of the effectiveness of legal institutions. We 
need more indigenous, scholarly assessments of the effectiveness of law and legal systems in Africa, and for that 
matter in the rest of the developing world, in order to determine which institutions and strategies work best in 
countries with low income levels. Moreover, it is essential that we develop more broadly comparative research in this 
area, rather than research targeted at either civil or common law countries with similar institutions. (Joireman 2001) 
43 Also a useful case of the struggle between executive and legislature can be found in (Donge 2006) 
44 Transparency International’s Global Corruption Report 2007 will focus on corruption in judicial systems.   21
democratization by giving citizens, or their representatives, more influence in the formulation and 
implementation of policies. Advocates of political decentralization assume that decisions made with greater 
participation will be better informed and more relevant to diverse interests in society than those made only by 
national political authorities. The concept implies that the selection of representatives from local electoral 
jurisdictions allows citizens to know better their political representatives and allows elected officials to know 
better the needs and desires of their constituents.” (Source: World Bank, Political Decentralisation website)
45 
Whilst there is some evidence that this has been the case in other parts of the world (e.g. 
West Bengal, Kerala, and some Brazilian states), the evidence from Africa is at best 
anecdotal. Overall, “… finding systematic evidence for decentralisation outcomes in Africa … 
is difficult” (Crook 2003). 
Despite donor enthusiasm for decentralisation in recent years – and the corresponding 
financial aid – decentralisation initiatives appear to have made little or no impact on improving 
democratic practices at a local level. Local institutions can be captured by local elites, and 
therefore become less responsive to people’s needs (Platteau and Gaspart 2003; Platteau 
2004). This could be explained as merely a replication of what happens in politics centrally, 
but Crook has a more nuanced argument. With evidence based on case material from Ghana, 
Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Tanzania and Kenya, he argues that the democratising effect of 
decentralisation depends on the politics of local-central relations and on the central regime’s 
ideological commitment to democracy (Crook 2003). In most cases, his study finds this 
commitment to be lacking; the difference being in degree. Instead; 
 “elite capture of local power structures has been facilitated by the desire of ruling elites to create and sustain 
power bases in the countryside… Even where the interests of underprivileged groups and of the rural poor 
have achieved some representation through democratic decentralisation [a case Crook makes for Ghana], 
accountability mechanisms are in general not strong enough to ensure that these interests are represented 
effectively in policy making.” (Crook 2003) 
The recent work of Christian Lund and colleagues makes other interesting findings about 
local-level institutions in Africa. How such processes play out at a national / state level is not 
entirely clear and could be fruitfully researched. Whilst they recognise the lack of any simple 
patterns; 
“… a central point can be distilled. When we approach the phenomenon of public authority and governance, it 
is useful not to see it as stemming from one single source, but rather to focus on how particular issues 
(security, justice, development, taxation and others) are governed and which actors are engaged in them. 
Many of the political actions in these spheres of life presuppose a state, but the state qualities of governance 
are not exclusively nested in government institutions. Consequently, there is an ongoing competition in 
society — perhaps most visibly so in African societies where governments are often under-funded, 
overstretched, in-capacitated and de-legitimized — to rearrange the boundaries of public authority between 
institutions so far unable to command enduring functional hegemony.” (Lund 2006a; Lund 2006b).
46  
In sum, there is an emerging consensus that decentralisation enables elite capture rather 
than expanding the democratic horizons. This however is an area for further research, since 
there is no hard and fast evidence that the patronage politics of elite capture is either positive 
or negative for democracy. For example, whilst elite control of oil resources and revenue in 
Nigeria has negative consequences, the local patronage politics of Ghana or Zambia might 
actually be a stabilising influence on national politics. 
7. Media 
A free and independent media – both broadcast and print -  is an essential component of 
democracy. A skilled independent media can provide citizens with essential political and 
economic information and analysis, encourage informed dialogue between policymakers and 
citizens, and demand accountability from political structures (Hudock 2003). The role of the 
                                                       
45http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/EXTDS
RE/0,,contentMDK:20246049~menuPK:2086199~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:390243,0
0.html. Accessed 6/10/06. 
46  We are not sure if this would be a fruitful avenue to explore but it looks promising.   22
media in Africa has received significant attention since the 1990s, particularly since the 
emergence of numerous private and independently owned media outlets. These were widely 
perceived to present opportunities to support democratic ideals, criticize ineffective or 
authoritarian governments and hold governing elites accountable by raising the costs of illegal 
practices (van de Walle, 2003a, Tettey 2001). While a free and independent media has, in 
some cases in Africa certainly made it more difficult for elites to operate outside of the formal 
system, a cursory scan of the literature also reveals that in many cases the media have 
become mouth pieces for the ruling elite (MISA 2004). 
Whilst there is quite an extensive literature on the media in Africa - including specific country 
case studies
47 and regional comparisons
48 – the role of elites in the media in Africa (as well as 
the role that the media can play in holding elites accountable and reducing their illegal 
activities) has not been explored in great detail. Whilst there is no doubt that 
neopatrimonialism operates within the media, this has received little attention in studies to 
date.  
Although the media environment in many parts of Africa has improved since the beginning of 
the democratisation process, the state of media freedom remains extremely varied and 
reflects the diversity of contexts and experience (Freedom House 2006, MISA 2004 and 
Reporters Without Borders 2006). Freedom House’s annual Freedom of the Press studies 
assesses the press and media environment in 48 African countries, rating the state of 
freedom of the press in each country as either ‘free’, ‘partly free’ or ‘not free’.
49 In 1990, the 
media in 7% of sub-Saharan Africa was ranked ‘free’, 19% ‘partly free’ and 74% ‘not free’ 
(Freedom House 1999). By 2005, the percentages had improved: 14.5% ‘free’, 39.5% ‘partly 
free’, and 46% ‘not free’ (Freedom House 2006).  Mauritania and Kenya are among the 
countries that saw progress during the year and were upgraded from ‘not free’ to ‘partly free’. 
This was largely a result of the decline in intimidation of journalists and an increase in the 
numbers of independent media in operation. Several West African countries (notably Guinea-
Bissau and Liberia) also noted improvement, while simultaneous declines were witnessed in 
other parts of Africa. According to RSF’s worldwide freedom of the press data (gathered in 
2005), Benin and Namibia both ranked just under the United Kingdom and above France, 
Australia and the United States.
50  In 2004, MISA studied the state of the media in Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, finding great variance between these countries – from Malawi which 
made significant steps towards improvement, to Zimbabwe which has seen a gradual but 
continuing increase in media oppression by the government (MISA 2004).  
Although the state of the media in Africa varies from country to country, with some countries 
undeniably seeing the emergence of a talented and vibrant independent media, the situation 
                                                       
47 For instance, Ghana (Alhassan 2005, Hasty 2005, Temin and Smith 2002), Uganda (Bengali 2005), South Africa 
(Jones 2001), Botswana (Taylor 2003), Kenya (Mwesige 2004, Ochilo 1993, Wanyande 1996) and Cameroon 
(Nyamnjoh, Wete and Fonchingong 1996)  
48 A number of interesting cross-country and regional comparative studies have been conducted (MISA 2004, 
Djankov et al. 2003, Afrobarometer 2004).  
49 Data is collected from overseas correspondents, staff and consultants, international visitors, human rights and 
press freedom organizations, specialists in geographic and geopolitical areas, governments and multilateral bodies’ 
reports, and a variety of domestic and international news media. The diverse nature of the questions used in the 
study seeks to encompass the varied ways in which pressure can be placed upon the flow of information and the 
ability of print, broadcast, and internet-based media to operate freely. More information about the methodology 
(including the specific questions within each category) can be found at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=56&year=2006 
50 The index is based solely on events between September 2004 and September 2005. RSF compiled a 
questionnaire with 50 criteria for assessing the state of press freedom in each country – including all violations 
directly affecting journalists (murders, imprisonment, physical attacks and threats) and news media (censorship, 
confiscation of issues, searches and harassment), registering the degree of impunity enjoyed by those responsible 
for such violations. The questionnaire was sent to partner organisations of Reporters Without Borders (14 freedom of 
expression groups in five continents) and its 130 correspondents around the world, as well as to journalists, 
researchers, jurists and human rights activists. A scale devised by the organisation was then used to give a country-
score to each questionnaire. The Statistics Institute of the University of Paris provided assistance and advice in 
processing the data reliably and thoroughly. The 167 countries ranked are those for which completed questionnaires 
from a number of independent sources were received. Others were not included because of a lack of credible data. 
More information about the methodology can be found at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=15338    23
on the whole remains rather bleak. Press conditions are particularly dire in Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea and Zimbabwe, where authoritarian governments frequently employ legal pressure, 
imprisonment and harassment to prevent independent domestic and foreign media outlets 
from reporting freely. Equatorial Guinea and Eritrea are two of the few African countries with 
virtually no independent media at all (Freedom House 2006). Not all countries that achieved a 
‘free’ rating in the Freedom House surveys are completely out of the danger zone, as evinced 
by the downgrading of Botswana from ‘free’ to ‘partly free’. Despite a number of independent 
weekly newspapers in the country, Radio Botswana and the only daily newspaper are both 
understood to be government-controlled (Taylor 2003). In Ethiopia and Uganda, the press 
was severely clamped down on in an attempt to curtail political opposition parties in the run 
up to and during elections.  
Freedom of the press and freedom of speech are constitutionally or legally guaranteed in 
most sub-Saharan countries, but in most cases these freedoms are not upheld in practice 
(notable exceptions are Benin, Ghana, Namibia and Cape Verde where the government 
generally adheres to constitutional and legal guarantees). Kenya rejected a draft constitution 
with specific provision for protection for the media in a 2005 referendum. In Swaziland, the 
King has the power to waive the limited freedom of speech enshrined in the constitution 
(Freedom House 2006). Many governments in Africa do not actively prioritise building 
capacity for a free and independent media as this is seen as a threat to their own power. In 
fact, in most countries, governments (and in some cases business elites) seek to control the 
media’s freedom to investigate and report by ignoring or manipulating laws, or using 
repression and intimidation. Press freedom is often particularly bad in periods leading up to 
elections. In Togo, for example, election coverage by private broadcasters was forbidden and 
telephone networks and media broadcast transmissions were actually cut off on the last 
voting day (Freedom House 2006).  
Governments have found various ways to stifle and control an independent media such as 
censorship, physical threat and harassment. The threat of withdrawal of state subsidies or 
advertising revenues (common in transition countries) is also an effective influencing tool. 
One of the most common ways that government and business elites exert pressure on the 
media is through defamation laws and libel suits (Djankov et al. 2003, Freedom House 2006). 
By 1998, for example, the Ghanaian independent media was embroiled in hundreds of libel 
suits brought by the government (Tettey 2001). In the Central African Republic, political 
leaders, state officials and influential business elites have also used criminal libel laws to 
prosecute journalists. In Kenya, a journalist with the East African Standard was charged with 
criminal defamation after publishing a report on the link between Kenya’s economic elite and 
the government. In Sierra Leone, vendors, printers and publishers can also be held to 
account for libel. Unsurprisingly then, self-censorship is not an unusual practice among 
African journalists (Freedom House 2006).  
Ethnic tension, or the threat of ethnic tension, is also used as an excuse to curtail freedom of 
the press in a number of countries. In Rwanda, where the media played a pivotal role in 
inciting violence during the genocide, the media is severely restricted by the government and 
inciting ‘divisionism’ is punishable by prison sentence. In the Republic of Congo and Ethiopia, 
incitement to ethnic hatred and violence is also considered a criminal offense and frequently 
used by the state as an excuse to arrest journalists. In Uganda, journalists have frequently 
been arrested on charges of inciting sectarianism. In Somalia, where ethnic fighting is 
ongoing, journalists are accused of bias in covering issues that span ethnic rivalries (Freedom 
House 2006). Frohardt and Temin point out that the media have largely been overlooked in 
conflict analysis, perhaps because the media may not be a direct cause of conflict. Frohardt 
and Temin’s study of the role of media in ‘vulnerable societies’ (defined as societies highly 
susceptible to movement towards civil conflict and/or repressive rule) suggests there are 
‘clues to conflict’ in the media, and have developed a number of structural and content 
indicators to provide these clues (Frohardt and Temin 2003).  
Independent media outlets are not a guaranteed safeguard against abuse because more 
often than not they are located within ‘a nexus of relations and find themselves dominated by 
more powerful partners’ (Berger 1998 quoted in Tettey 2001). They may also have strong ties 
to the government.  For example, MISA found that in Botswana, Mozambique and Namibia   24
both public and private media organizations gave proportionally greater coverage to the ruling 
party (MISA 2004). Sometimes links between influential members of particular groups and 
media outlets may be more subtle – for example, through the existence of discrete financial 
relationships (Frohardt and Temin 2003). Where the government controls the media, it can be 
particularly difficult to operate effectively and even to employ independent and skilled staff. 
Chabal and Daloz present the example of the head of the national radio of a major West 
African country, who confided that he was often pressured into hiring relatives of the political 
elites – to resist would mean losing his job (Chabal and Daloz 1999). Given the ethnic 
diversity of most African countries, and the divisions that often fall along ethnic lines, media 
outlets can also be biased towards particular ethnic groups. They are also often biased in 
favour of urban issues, excluding the poorest and most marginalized populations living in 
more remote areas. Media employees in many African countries lack the technical skills 
needed to effectively report on economic and sector-specific issues.  
The question of ownership is key to analysing the independence and effectiveness of the 
media, and reveals how elites can manipulate it to their own advantage. In their study of 97 
countries, including 21 in Africa, Djankov et al find that ‘almost universally the largest media 
firms are owned by the government or by private families’ (Djankov et al, 2003, p.363). 
Governments in Africa control 61% of the top five (in circulation) daily newspapers and reach 
84% of the audience for the top five television stations. In 71% of African countries the state 
has a monopoly on television broadcasting (Djankov et al, 2003). One consequence of state 
ownership is that media tends to serve those in power (the political and financial elites). 
Djankov et al investigate whether or not government ownership of the media cures market 
failures or undermines political and economic freedom, finding indications that support the 
latter. They point out that it is important to make the distinction between ‘state’ and ‘party’ 
ownership – state owned stations will survive even if the party is voted out of power. State-
owned media will often favour the government in its political coverage. In Botswana, for 
example, opposition activities are covered by the media, but the overall perception of the 
contents of media products is that the government has an inordinate amount of influence over 
the press compared with the opposition parties (Leepile 1996 quoted in Taylor 2003). Media 
owners generally control news content, so diversity of ownership, as well as media staff, 
generally determine the degree of bias with which news will be reported. If there is little 
diversity among journalists and owners of media outlets, the journalists and outlets are more 
vulnerable to abuse by members of the dominant group(s) in a particular society (e.g., the 
elites). Frohardt and Temin find that abuse of media is most likely when:  
“all or a significant portion of media outlets are owned by one or a small number of people, particularly if 
those people are of the same ethnicity or religion, support the same political party, or are from the same 
region” (Frohardt and Temin, 2003, p.4).  
The mass media enjoys (surprisingly) relatively large levels of public trust across Africa (42%) 
(Afrobarometer 2004). Government broadcasting media are generally perceived as more 
trustworthy than new independent broadcasters. In print media, private and public sources 
enjoy virtually equal levels of trust (36% and 37%, respectively). The only exception is 
Senegal, where newspaper readers (an urban, educated minority) awarded more trust to 
independent print media than government sources (Bratton et al 2004). 
As with many other aspects of public life in African countries, women and gender issues 
generally assume a peripheral role in both print and television media. Morna and Mufune’s 
study of 12 countries indicated that there is, by and large, a huge gap in the gender 
awareness of much African media. Women often do not get proportional representation in the 
media, and when they do stories about women are often told by male sources, portraying 
women in social (rather than political or economic) roles and reinforcing traditional gender 
stereotypes. Because women are more active in television presenting than in print journalism, 
it has been argued that women have taken "soft" roles in the media (Morna and Mufune 
2003). 
It is useful to assess how the diversity of country contexts, ownership and institutional 
dynamics identified above affect the various news mediums: radio, television, print and 
Internet.   25
Radio 
Radio is the chief source of news for the majority of the population in most African countries 
(Afrobarometer 2003, Freedom House 2006). Radio in most countries remains state-owned 
and heavily influenced by ruling party and opposition elites, often broadcasting pro-
government views and propaganda. There are exceptions, of course, as in Guinea, where the 
state-owned media provides coverage that is mostly favourable to the government but also 
criticises local-level officials and reports on the activities of the opposition. In rare cases, radio 
staff have achieved small victories in the face of repressive environments. In 2005, for 
instance, members of Chad’s Union of Private Radio Stations organized demonstrations and 
a week-long strike in protest against the number of arbitrary detentions of journalists. During 
the strike, all private print publications and radio broadcasts were replaced with bulletins on 
the state of press freedom in the country. In response to the protest, an appeals court 
overturned sentences on several jailed journalists (Freedom House 2006).  
Some countries are seeing the increased emergence of private FM radio stations that are 
relatively free to engage in critical reporting and criticism of the government (for example in 
Ghana). In other cases (for example, Gabon), privately owned radio stations exist but their 
content is largely apolitical (Freedom House 2006). Private radio stations are however often 
confined by legal and financial restrictions and subject to intimidation by powerful political or 
financial elites (Freedom House 2006). They usually have to obtain licences from 
governments, who may use this as a way to control or prevent them from broadcasting. Whilst 
the law in Ethiopia permits private radio stations, the state has so far failed to issue any 
licenses (Freedom House 2006).  Privately owned radio stations often have a limited reach, 
particularly in rural areas, as is the case in Angola, Botswana and Kenya. Again, there are 
exceptions, as in Benin (rated by Freedom House as ‘free’ in 2005), where Golfe FM 
broadcasts in three of the country’s main languages (French, Fon and Yorouba) including in 
remote rural areas (Freedom House 2006). 
Television 
In many African countries, local television news is limited to state-owned channels (e.g. 
Botswana Television), making it easy for governments to control content. Private television 
stations do operate freely in some countries, including Benin, where 2 of the 5 television 
stations are private and Comoros, where private stations are funded by individuals and 
citizens living abroad. In Swaziland, the sole private television station is owned by a member 
of the royal family (Freedom House 2006). In other countries, (Burundi, Eritrea and Ethiopia) 
there are currently no privately owned television stations. Importantly though, television is not 
a widely accessed news medium in Africa, since it is mostly used in urban and affluent areas 
(Freedom House 2006). An Afrobarometer survey in 2003 found that half of the Africans 
interviewed never watch TV news, and that urban residents are five times more likely than 
their rural counterparts to watch television every day (Afrobarometer 2003). 
Newspapers 
The written press is generally more liberalised than either radio or television in Africa. In 
Malawi, for example, six of the major eight newspapers are privately owned and believed to 
be editorially independent (Freedom House 2006). Afrobarometer has identified the print 
press as ‘central… in the cultivation of democratic attitudes and practices’, reporting that 
African newspaper readers are more likely (71%) than African radio listeners (58%) to resist a 
government shut down of independent publications (Afrobarometer, 2003, p.6). In general, 
however, newspaper readership is not widespread. In many cases, newspapers are merely a 
source of news for urban, educated and wealthier elites. In Madagascar, for example, the six 
daily newspapers and numerous weeklies and monthlies are aimed at the French-educated 
urban elites (Freedom House 2006). Generally low literacy levels and the often-prohibitive 
costs of purchasing a newspaper, means that the majority of the population in African 
countries do not have the means to access news in the print media. In East Africa, for 
example, the cost of a magazine exceeds the daily wage of most urban workers (Adagala 
1994 quoted in Tettey 2001). In many countries, the content of private newspapers is also 
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linked to the various fighting factions and rely on these factions for protection (Freedom 
House 2006). This is generally understood to influence content and coverage. In some 
countries, such as Equatorial Guinea, there is no independent media although private 
newspapers do exist - in essence these serve as ‘opposition mouthpieces and are therefore 
tied to the political fortunes of their sponsors’ (Freedom House 2006). Eritrea currently has no 
independent or privately owned print media and the importation of foreign newspapers is 
illegal. 
Additionally, the private press often suffers from poor or irregular financing (including limited 
advertising revenue and low reader subscription levels). A majority of Gabonese private 
newspapers are printed in Cameroon due to high local printing costs – and newspapers 
printed abroad are subject to government review before distribution. In Ghana, journalists are 
poorly paid and believed to frequently engage in unprofessional conduct as a result, inventing 
sensationalist news stories (Freedom House 2006). 
Internet 
Since 2005, Freedom House has commented on Internet usage in its evaluation of freedom of 
the press in sub-Saharan Africa. In most countries, the Internet is not censored and could be 
a vehicle for expressing free and independent views. However, lack of access due to the high 
costs of technology and widespread poverty means that this form of media is for the time 
being accessible only to a small portion of the population. In most countries, Internet usage 
hovers on or below the 1% mark. In a handful of countries, the government actively monitors 
Internet usage and the content of emails. In Equatorial Guinea (one of the least free media 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa), it is believed that government operatives monitor citizens’ 
email and Internet use. In Togo, owners of Internet cafes are required to present records of 
client activities if asked to do so by the state (Freedom House 2006).  
8. Civil  society 
Given the perceived failure of many African states to institutionalise democratic politics and 
contribute to economic development, analysts increasingly argue for alternative approaches 
to governance and social development giving a broader set of actors – notably civil society – 
a heightened role (Chabal and Daloz 1999). Aili Mari Tripp argues that the ‘exaggerated 
importance of electoral democracy’ fails to acknowledge the valuable role that numerous 
social actors – media, women’s movements, faith-based organisations, credit, human rights 
and environmental organisations – are playing in laying the foundations for democratic 
institutions in many African countries (Tripp 2000). 
According to Gyimah-Boadi: 
“Africa’s civil societies are among the chief engines driving the continent’s political development. With their 
increased sophistication and mounting capabilities, they are helping to drive the shift from unalloyed state 
hegemony to nascent pluralism. Their growing self-awareness and determination to defend their autonomy 
against all efforts at suppression or cooptation (especially those originating from the state) are signs that they 
are here to stay” (Gyimah-Boadi quoted in Tripp 2000).  
While there is an infinitely large and diverse literature on the civil society’s role in the 
democratisation process in countries in Africa, the issue of how elites function within and 
through civil society has been largely neglected. 
Interest in civil society in Africa spans the past few decades, although the emphasis and 
activities have changed over time. During the 1980s, donors supported civil society 
organisations (CSOs) in assuming the service delivery role that the state often failed to fill. In 
some countries, for example Tanzania, government elites saw this as an opportunity to obtain 
a piece of the funding cake, setting up so-called ‘independent’ CSOs that were staffed by civil 
servants (Lange, Wallewik and Kiondo 2000, Brock 2004). In the 1990s donor emphasis – in 
Africa and elsewhere - shifted towards engaging CSOs as partners in the policy process. Civil 
society organisations in Africa serve many different functions, and the term ‘civil society’ has 
become somewhat of a broad umbrella to cover a range of activities in the non-governmental 
sector. Reflecting the broad use of the term, this section will look at CSOs more broadly, while 
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movements and faith-based organisations. Unions, professional associations and the 
churches typically played a prominent role in the democratisation of the early 1990s, but they 
quickly retreated from politics once multiparty rule was in place (van de Walle 2003b). 
It is crucial to distinguish between membership and non-membership-based civil society 
organisations in Africa. Because there are so few membership-based organisations, where 
funding is derived from the members, most CSOs in Africa are dependent on their funders – 
often from within the international donor community. Within the donor-funded CSOs, it is also 
important to distinguish whether they are driven by a single donor or a group of donors. The 
most effective CSOs are those that are funded by groups of donors, as this makes it easier to 
maintain a degree of autonomy despite the dependence on funding.  
Despite the changing emphasis on the role of civil society in international development, most 
CSOs remain engaged in service delivery activities rather than advocacy or policy-making. 
Several challenges face CSOs operating in Africa. A major one is the lack of genuine political 
space for participation. Even where participation takes place, the quality and impact depends 
on support from international development actors as well as power relationships between the 
state and civil society actors (Brock 2004). Even the more autonomous NGOs that emerged 
in Africa in the 1990s face continued pressures for cooptation by governments and main 
political parties who employ various strategies to limit their activities (Tripp 2000). Weak 
capacity is another problem that plagues the civil society sector and the increasing emphasis 
on general budget support brings with it the risk that CSOs will be forced into a new 
dependence on their governments (Lister and Nyamugasira 2003). Poor economic conditions, 
in particular a weak private sector, can galvanise collective action behind self-help efforts. 
This can also undermine the accountability and credibility of civil society organisation due to 
dependence on funding sources (Robinson and Friedman 2005). 
Many CSOs have similar goals although interactions between them are limited and there is 
thus much inter-organisational rivalry. Moreover, while civil society strengthening is often 
considered a ‘self-evident’ good by the development world, many civil society actors are in 
fact driven by self-interest and dominated by elites. A key question is whether the emergence 
of countless CSOs in Africa over the past decade or so are really presenting an alternative to 
the elites that have historically dominated the NGO landscape (Lange, Wallewik and Kiondo 
2000, Brock 2004, Aiyede 2003).  Although CSOs are often seen as an important actor in 
developing local capacity (in the form of social capital) there is a danger that the social capital 
that is built up becomes exclusive, serving small portions of the population (elites) and 
excluding the poorest and most marginalised communities. For example, many CSOs are 
urban-based and focus on the urban communities’ needs rather than the rural communities. 
In other cases, CSOs can be ethnically biased. 
Several analysts have argued that the traditional state/ civil society dichotomy popular in the 
international development arena does not capture the reality of many African countries 
(Chabal and Daloz 1999, Lewis 2002, Brock 2004, Orji 2003). The arena of civil society often 
includes community-based organisations, which tend to be informal and formed from social 
configurations of kinship. This is the case in Tanzania and Uganda, for example. 
Nevertheless, despite the prominence of this type of organisation in many African countries, 
donors favour CSOs with formal modern structures that resemble Northern ideas of civil 
society (Brock 2004; Lange, Wallewik and Kiondo 2000). Civil society in Africa assumes a 
different character from that in most Western liberal democracies, reflecting differences in the 
underlying social and economic conditions and historical and political circumstances. Chabal 
and Daloz argue that, rather than institutionalising, much of Africa is moving towards ‘greater 
informalisation’. Lewis explores different views of the relevance of CSOs for Africa, arguing 
that the version of civil society that has dominated development discourse agendas ignores 
the possibility for conflict between civil society and the state. It also ignores organisations that 
are based on ethnicity or kin or local traditions, and may miss groups that take on an 
unfamiliar form (Lewis 2002). 
A number of studies have looked at whether civil society in particular African contexts is able 
to fulfil the role assigned to it by international donors, and many analysts argue that civil 
society has shown disappointing results (Brock 2004, Manor 2003). A number of analysts 
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judgement and that perceived failures are largely due to unrealistic expectations of rapid 
political transformation. 
The manifestation of civil society in different African contexts is incredibly diverse. A number 
of studies have been carried out on civil society in Nigeria, for example, highlighting that 
despite appearances of democracy (elections held in 1999 brought the current President 
Olusegun Obasanjo to power), the militarism of the previous dictatorship continues to pervade 
civil society (Agozino and Idem 2001, Abiodun 2000). In Nigeria, ‘the military governments 
have shaped civil society more than civil society has shaped political events.’ Democratic rule 
expanded the space for political expression but non-democratic actors have become very 
visible and power seekers have dominated the political space. The middle class or 
professional associations that were at the forefront of the democracy movement tend to be 
more and more divorced from the grassroots (Ayiede 2003). 
Zimbabwe is another interesting example of the diverse nature of civil society in Africa. 
Hammar and Jensen highlight that one of the key paradoxes of the present crisis in 
Zimbabwe is the country’s decline in official democratic spaces for political expression, while 
simultaneously experiencing a dynamic growth in political consciousness and activism within 
an increasingly vibrant civil society (Hammar and Jensen 2002). In Ghana and Uganda, civil 
society organisations contributed to independence, although the emergence of one-party or 
military regimes limited the autonomy of large membership organisations and some were co-
opted into party machines (Robinson and Friedman 2005). A number of studies have also 
been carried out where civic organizations have been at the forefront of major social change, 
for example by contributing to the overthrow of the apartheid regime (Greenstein, Kola and 
Lopes 2004). Bond has written on elites in the transition from apartheid in South Africa, 
although his work is not very analytically rigorous and he fails to develop any sort of thesis on 
relationships and deals developed between economic and elites and the ruling party (Bond 
2000). 
The role of faith-based organisations within civil society is also receiving more attention in the 
research. Kuperus examines the role of Christian religious organisations in the regime change 
process in South Africa and Zimbabwe (Kuperus, 1999). Churches have traditionally been an 
active sector within civil society, attracting large membership. In Zambia, for example, a study 
by Bratton indicated that 75% of respondents were involved in the church as opposed to 
cooperatives (7%), sports clubs (3%), and trade unions and women’s clubs (each 2%). Thus, 
churches in Zambia served as ‘protected space within civil society for citizens to associate 
freely and for opposition political leaders to articulate a critique of the old regime’
51 (Bratton 
1999). Randall and Svasand observe that ‘the link between strong civil society mobilization 
(including churches) and the electoral success of new parties challenging the incumbent 
government is regularly noted’. They cite the example of the opposition movement in 
Zimbabwe that included ‘scores of civil society organizations like the influential and well 
respected Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and religious organizations like the 
Zimbabwe Council of Churches’ (Randall and Svasand, 2002, p.40). Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that churches and faith-based CSOs can be exclusive – serving their own 
religious communities rather than communities as a whole. 
There has also been significant research published on the role of CSOs in the budget 
process, for example by the International Budget Project. In 2003, Norad sponsored a study 
on the role of civil society in SWAPs in Zambia (Lexow 2003), and there has been work 
carried out on civil society responses to PRSPs (Possing 2003). Recent work has also 
addressed civil society and regionalism in Africa, arguing that CSOs need to develop 
innovative strategies to engage with Africa’s new inter-state bodies. These can amplify the 
power of national associations and act as an alternative to national power. However, these 
networks can be captured by state elites (Karbo 2001). 
Despite the extensive literature on civil society in general, a number of critical areas remain 
under-researched. Despite the often unquestioned assumption that civil society organisations 
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are able to play an important role in strengthening democracy, relatively little is known about 
their effectiveness and impact, particularly in the policy making sphere (Robinson and 
Friedman 2005, Chowdhury, Finlay-Notman and Hovland 2006, Court and Maxwell 2006). 
Further exploration of the role that elites play in civil society is also necessary. Does the 
emergence of an active civil society result in a renewal of voices – and a new way of thinking 
- in the policy process or is this simply another vehicle for elites to exercise their power? 
There is also little systematic work on the ways CSOs use (or abuse or ignore) evidence in 
attempts to influence policy processes (Pollard and Court 2005). More research could also be 
done on how changing trends in patterns and modalities of aid are affecting the roles of 
CSOs. Sector-wide approaches (SWAps) and their potential value notwithstanding, there is 
widespread concern that relationships between CSOs and government will change 
significantly as a result and that there has been little analysis of these changes (Lister and 
Nyamugasira 2003).  There is the need for scholars and practitioners to reflect on the specific 
contexts as well as social and political environments within which civil organisations (Orji 
2003). There is also a weak understanding of how to engage CSOs more effectively – more 
rigorous and systematic analysis would help inform more effective engagement. Lewis argues 
the need for more micro-studies of existing civil society – groups that are more broadly 
defined and cultural varied types of civil society. More up-close observation is necessary 
(Lewis 2002).  
9. Women’s  movements 
Although the third wave of democratisation has increased opportunities for women’s 
mobilisation in Africa, research on women and politics on the continent (including the potential 
of women’s movements to challenge neopatrimonial structures) is still nascent and marked by 
a general lack of in-depth investigations. The most common literature on women’s 
movements to date appears to be case studies. Tripp and Geisler, for example, have 
explored women’s movements in Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Botswana 
(Geisler 1995, Geisler 1987, Tripp 2001a, Tripp 2001b). While women’s movements are 
generally seen as one of the most active, and successful, groups within civil society in Africa, 
a key question remains: Does creating space for women’s voices give rise to new women’s 
voices, or does this space in turn become dominated by elites? This remains a critical gap in 
current research. 
The important role that the women’s movement has played in associational life in several 
African countries is widely acknowledged. In Tanzania, for example, 80% of all NGOs are 
women’s organisations, and in Uganda the women’s movement has been identified as the 
most organised sector of civil society (Tripp 2000).
52 Women’s organizations cover a broad 
spectrum of activities - local multipurpose and religiously based organisations, professional 
associations (female doctors, engineers, lawyers and media workers), women's rights groups, 
advocacy organizations (focusing on specific issues like reproductive rights or violence 
against women), and groups catering to particular sections of the population (disabled 
women, widows and second wives), legal aid associations, women's credit, finance and 
development associations, and other social and cultural associations (for example, the 
Uganda Women Football Association)  (Tripp 2001).  
Several reasons have been identified to account for the success of these types of women’s 
movements in Africa. Firstly, the marginalisation of women in formal politics has in many 
cases enabled them to maintain relative autonomy in the civil society sphere. In most African 
countries, women do not have equal access to participation in formal political systems. 
Because of gendered divisions of labour, gendered organisational modes and the general 
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exclusion of women from political arenas, women have tended to have a different relationship 
to the state, power and patronage structures. Due to traditional perceptions of the role of 
women, they are often relegated to home and family matters, while men dominate the public 
sphere. Women are limited in their access to the benefits of the formal political sphere and 
clientelism through informal networks (Tripp 2001). Because of their exclusion from both 
formal and informal political and social networks, women have entered the civil society sphere 
in attempts to influence policy. While the exclusion of women from formal politics and 
clientelistic networks has disadvantaged women in some respects, Tripp argues that it has 
also had the unintended consequence of positioning them in a way that gives them the 
potential to challenge state-led clientelistic networks and practices (Tripp 2001b). This is due 
to their relative autonomy and lack of constraints that often result from dependence on the 
state and dominant political parties for funding and support (Tripp 2001). 
Being autonomous allows more freedom to operate independently. In Uganda, many women's 
organizations are self-supporting, although urban-based NGOs tend to be more reliant on 
donor funding. Nevertheless, both urban and rural organisations generally do not depend on 
the traditional state patronage networks that have resulted in dependency relationships 
between state and society (Tripp 2001). The women's movement is seen as one of the most 
coordinated and active social movements in Uganda, and one of the most effective women's 
movements in Africa more generally – largely due to its relative autonomy from an otherwise 
dominant state. Despite enormous pressures for cooptation, it has taken advantage of the 
political space afforded by the semi-authoritarian Museveni government, which has promoted 
women's leadership to serve its own ends. Although leaders and organisations reflect varying 
degrees of autonomy and cooptation, the women's movement as a whole has had a visible 
impact on policy as a result of its capacity to set its own far-reaching agenda and freely select 
its own leaders (Tripp 2001). 
However, it is not uncommon for women’s organisations to themselves be dominated by elites 
– often linked to the state. Historically, women’s movements in many African countries were 
dominated by groups tied to the ruling parties – often as women’s wings of ruling and main 
opposition parties. The 31
st December Women’s Movement in Ghana was affiliated with the 
National Democratic Congress, The Tanzania Women’s Union with Chama Cha Mapinduzi, 
and the Women’s League with the United National Independence Party in Zambia (Tripp 
2001, Geisler 1987, Geiger 1997). With the emergence of electoral democracy in Africa, 
some leaders began to realise the value of the female vote and created women’s wings of 
existing political parties. This happened for a number of reasons. In some cases, African 
leaders saw the appointment of women to official political positions as a way to woo female 
voters and win their votes and support, as in Uganda where Museveni has supported what 
has largely been acknowledged as one of the most successful women’s movements in Africa 
(Tripp 2000). In more extreme cases, supporting or creating women’s movements has been a 
way to control the political activities of women, by limiting their activities to more superficial 
moral and ethical issues rather than substantive political or economic activities. As a result, 
official women’s wings of political parties have largely been ineffectual. They were often 
tasked with a narrow set of `development' issues, such as family planning, nutrition, health, 
women's morality, childcare and homemaking skills (Tripp 2001; Geisler 1987). The women’s 
wing of the ruling party in Botswana, for example, became a body concerned with fundraising 
and welfare issues, although it had originally been intended as a forum to discuss women’s 
concerns and influence government policy (Geisler 1995). 
As a result, leadership structures of these women’s wings often mirror those of the political 
parties they are tied to, and tend to be dominated by the wives, sisters and daughters of 
leading politicians (Geisler 1995, Geisler 1987, Tripp 2001). As such, they too become elite-
dominated. Members of women’s associations are often rewarded for loyalty to the party 
rather than merit. This was characteristic of the Botswana Council of Women immediately 
after independence, and the Women’s League in Zambia. Members of the Women’s League 
in Zambia largely use the League to lobby for their own interests - they are preferentially 
supplied with scarce goods if they are properly connected, and expect UNIP to award those 
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Women’s organisations that are linked to political parties are often led by older and less 
educated women (linked to the political elites) who are less likely to oppose the terms set by 
the traditional male elites. With the post-1990s political liberalisation, ruling party-affiliated 
organisations lost their appeal and no longer attracted as much donor support. As a result, 
the wives of politicians who had led women’s wings often became patrons of so-called 
independent NGOs rather than of large state-affiliated umbrella women's organisations or 
national mass women's organisations (Tripp 2001). It is not uncommon, for example, for 
wives of African leaders to head up large NGOs. Frequently, younger educated and 
professional women are marginalised from arrangements that reward loyalty to the party over 
merit. For example, in Zambia, educated women stand little chance to gain and hold positions 
in the League against uneducated women who are supported by the rank and file of UNIP 
(Geisler 1987). They are therefore more likely to become involved in independent women’s 
organisations. A larger pool of educated women facilitates leadership of women’s 
organisations, but these educated women are also more likely to move out of the women’s 
movements to take formal political office (Tripp 2001). 
While it is often suggested that women’s movements are able to unite divided women over 
common issues of interest, it is critical to acknowledge that women are not one homogenous 
group. Women in Africa – as in other countries – are often divided by urban/ rural, ethnic and 
class distinctions (Geisler 1987). The educated elites’ knowledge of, and interest in, the day-
to-day life and problems of rural women is often minimal. Rural women can also be disunited 
amongst themselves – as with competition between urban women, rural women can be 
divided by jealousy and competition for resources. For example, in her case studies on 
Zimbabwe and Botswana, Geisler found that married women, both within the women’s league 
and outside, members of the elite and the proletariat, try to maintain their marriages and 
please their husbands, who in return are expected to provide social status and/ or economic 
security. Enmity between these women increases with economic dependency on men, and is 
especially pronounced amongst the urban elite (Geisler 1987). 
Various organisations and individual leaders can exhibit different degrees of autonomy and 
cooptation (Tripp 2001). Issues of common concern - such as reproductive rights, women and 
politics, legal rights, environmental concerns and children’s rights - can bridge social divisions 
between women, which may partially explain the success of women’s movements relative to 
other types of civil society organisations. Women’s mobilisation often defies neopatrimonial 
patterns of mobilisation that tend to build political bases through more narrowly-defined 
patronage networks along ethnic, religious, regional and other such lines. One societal 
cleavage that is not as easily overridden by gender interests, however, is that of class. In her 
study on Uganda, Tripp noted that Ugandan women’s associations are for the most part 
crosscutting and inclusive, incorporating women regardless of ethnicity, religious or regional 
background, or political affiliation (Tripp 2001). 
Other reasons that serve to strengthen the women's movement in Africa (Tripp uses the 
example of Uganda, but the factors are relevant to other countries as well) include growing 
cultural openness to women's activism and to advancing women's status in society, as well as 
support by donors and international women’s movements.  
Despite the progress made by women’s movements in countries such as Uganda, the 
responsiveness of the state to women’s movements (both state-affiliated and independent) in 
many other cases remains low. Paradoxically, as Tripp points out, ‘Although (women’s) 
organisations were subject to clientelistic manipulations to gain votes, funds and establish a 
popular base of support, they were largely kept apolitical’ (Tripp, 2001, p.111). Women’s 
wings often see their activities limited to social welfare work, fundraising for the party, 
campaigning on behalf of their husbands and ‘teaching African women the art of being a good 
housewife’ (Geisler, 1995, p. 550). State strategies for engaging/ dealing with women’s 
organisations have ranged from: controlling women’s organisations in order to tap into donor 
funding (in some cases by requiring participation in state-run umbrella organisations), co-
opting existing women’s organisations (by dangling patronage in front of organisation 
leaders), creating new quasi-independent or umbrella organisations that appear to be 
autonomous but are tasked with monitoring independent organisations and diluting their 
political activities, to more obvious harassment, repression and bans to existence (Tripp,   32
2001). Independent women's organisations and leaders have come under extraordinary 
pressures of cooptation. In Uganda, for example, this is true to the extent that allegations 
have been made that the women's movement was in fact a creation of the ruling party (Tripp 
2001). 
The impact of women’s movements on politics in Africa in general is an under-researched 
area (Tripp 2001, Resnick n.d.). Tripp suggests that further empirical investigation and 
theoretical consideration can enhance understanding of how women might successfully 
challenge existing neopatrimonial structures. Specific areas she highlights for future research 
are: the differential impact of levels of civil and political liberties, donor and foreign influences, 
educational levels of women, elite divisions, regional variance and networks, and other factors 
that might result in differing levels of associational autonomy and challenges to clientelism 
(Tripp 2001b). As emphasised in the beginning of this section, it is also crucial to further 
investigate whether the emergence of women’s movements are indeed presenting new 
opportunities for non-elites to articulate their issues and concerns (as the general assumption 
seems to be) or whether these spaces are being taken over by the elites. 
10. Trade unions 
Trade unions are membership organisations with a primary responsibility to protect and 
advance the interests of their own members, although they often extend their activities to 
broader social and political concerns (Spooner 2004). With a few exceptions (most notably 
Zambia and South Africa, but also Nigeria and Ghana) the literature on trade unions in Africa 
is rather scarce – and that which explores the linkages between elites and trade unions even 
scarcer. The studies that have been conducted seem to be predominantly case study-based. 
A relatively comprehensive recent work, for instance, outlines the legal, political and 
economic environment in which trade unions in six African countries (Zambia, Ghana, 
Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Namibia, and South Africa) operate in order to outline the challenges they 
face. This set of case studies highlights the diverse environment and experiences of trade 
unions in different countries in Africa. One aspect of this is current unionization rates in the 
formal sector - approximately 50% in Zambia, Namibia, and Ghana; 13% in Zimbabwe; 33% 
in Nigeria; and 26% in South Africa. They also reveal the diverse conditions under which 
unions operate. In some countries workers enjoy basic labour and organisational rights and 
unions have relatively good relationships with the government, while in others workers are 
exposed to suppression and intimidation by employers and the state (Muneku et al, 2004). 
The paucity of literature on trade unions and their effect on democracy in Africa is to some 
extent due to the predominantly agricultural economies of most African countries and the 
absence in many cases of real powerful labour unions. In Tanzania, for example, only a small 
portion of the labour force is engaged in the formal sector, and unionisation rates outside the 
formal sector are extremely low (Dasgupta 2002). In 1983 in The Gambia, potential 
membership of the labour union has been restricted by the fact that 74% of the population 
was employed in ‘agriculture and related primary activities; most of these were independent 
small farmers who cultivated groundnuts for export’ (Hughes and Perfect, 1989, p.549). In 
Ghana, agriculture, forestry and fishing represent approximately 60% of total employment 
(Anyemedu 2000).
53 In other countries, unions are founded by the government or main 
opposition parties, and as a result have limited autonomy and power. In Eritrea, for example, 
‘the only non-religious, membership-based organisations to operate… are those under the 
party’s direct control’ (Connell 2004). The National Confederation of Eritrean Workers is not 
permitted to organise any segment of the work force without state and party permission. 
Trade unions have, however, successfully challenged incumbent rule in a few countries 
(Wood 2006, Harsch 1993, Gyimah-Boadi 1996, Iheduru 2002). In Mali, the media ran 
exposes and trade unions, popular organizations and opposition parties urged the removal of 
corrupt officials and the recovery of embezzled funds. In Benin, Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon, 
trade unions responded to economic crisis and high levels of personal enrichment with calls 
for ‘income redistribution’ (Harsch 1993).  
                                                       
53 ‘Data on the labour market in Ghana has traditionally been characterised by its paucity and unreliability’ 
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There is some evidence that the influence of trade unions in Africa – which in many countries 
was never high to begin with – is on the decline. This is partly due to declining union 
membership rates following economic crises and cut-downs in the formal sector. In Ghana, 
for example, total trade union membership went down to 572,598 in 1998, compared with 
630,843 in 1985. Decline in employment was due to increased competition from imported 
goods and retrenchment of labour in the private sector (Anyemedu 2000). In Zambia, the 
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions played a leading role in the fight for democracy, but has 
weakened since then (Hedblom 2005, Burnell 2001). The current ruling party - the Movement 
for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) – which was founded by a range of actors including labour, 
business groups, churches and universities - has taken on many of the corrupt, clientelist 
characteristics of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) (the party in replaced in 
power in 1991). ‘The party’s upper echelons were subsequently hijacked by a narrower 
coterie of ex-UNIP politicians and businesspeople’ (Burnell, 2001, p.16). There are also 
accusations that President Chiluba (former Chairman-General of the ZCTU from 1974-1991) 
engages in neopatrimonial practices, by, among other things, making donations to local 
churches for their social work, often before elections (Burnell 2001). 
Although initially influential, the labour movement in Nigeria was severely weakened by the 
time the democratisation movement started to gather momentum (Remi Ayiede 2004). The 
movement, already hurt by the economic crisis of the 1980s, underwent organisational 
restructuring, which ‘removed control of the unions from the rank and file’ (Remi Ayiede, 
2004, p.226), and union leaders became co-opted by the state in order to weaken labour 
opposition to state action and policies.  
“Unions… began to rely on government patronage for funding. This, more than anything else, is what 
weakened union organisational unity and independence, and thereby the influence and power of union 
leadership” (Remi Ayiede, 2004, p.227).  
Trade unions in Botswana have been significantly weakened through formal state legislation 
(Maruatona 1999). Strikes are severely constrained and it is difficult to register new unions, 
although this is a legal requirement (Taylor 2003). Dlamini is optimistic about recent 
developments allowing union affiliates the independence to support political parties of their 
choice, arguing that this means labour will:  
“play a more assertive and proactive role in politics. This coming out of the shell will strengthen the 
characteristically weak civil society in Botswana and rid the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU) of 
the stigma that it is an instrument of the ‘paternalistic’ state” (Dlamini 2002). 
Perhaps one of the most-studied trade union movements in Africa is that of South Africa 
where, in the 1980s, trade unions played a major part in opposition to the apartheid 
government, together with various community and political organisations, including the African 
National Congress (ANC). This resulted in a close relationship with the current ruling regime 
in South Africa and, to some extent, the dilution of a completely independent identity (Wood 
2006, Bezuidenhout 2000).  
The strength of unions is dependent on their membership numbers and financial power 
(Dasgupta 2002). The harsh economic climate of the 1990s led employment in the formal 
sector to shrink in several countries, and many labour unions became ‘dog(s) that did not 
bark’ (Burnell 2001, p.17). A study on Kenya has argued that elite workers tend to abstain 
from union membership (Manda, Bigsten and Mwabu 2005). Nevertheless there is also 
evidence that membership in trade unions is most often limited to the formal sector. 
Consequently, the vast majority of the population employed in the informal sector are 
excluded from any victories achieved by unions (Muneku et al 2004).  
In South Africa, the past 20 years has seen union membership becoming increasingly skilled. 
This has excluded temporary employees as well as young and rural workers, resulting in:  
“allegations that the labour movement represents the interests of an elite grouping, who are selfishly pursuing 
their goals regardless of the long term consequences in terms of employment and economic growth” (Wood 
2006). 
Despite personal linkages between privileged and marginalised groups through the operation 
of extended and informal support networks, the South African labour market remains firmly   34
divided between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ who often have competing interests (Wood 2006). In 
countries with large informal sectors characterised by an absence of union activity, it is 
therefore necessary to ask how representative unions really are. Women and other vulnerable 
sections of the labour force (for example, younger, less educated workers) often have limited 
representation (Dasgupta 2002). Other sources of labour disunity have been identified as 
‘ethnicity, disputes over money, personal enmity among labour leaders and political rivalry’ 
(Hughes and Perfect, 1989, p.570). 
Some research has been carried out on unions’ wider relationships with other civic 
organizations – as in the literature on labour unions as social movements in Nigeria and 
South Africa (Remi Ayiede 2004). The issue of union relationships with civil society/ NGOs 
also arises when looking at trade union efforts to organize the informal sector.  
“A relatively small but increasing number of unions… are successfully organizing informal economy workers. 
There is a considerable variety of organizational models in evidence, including new informal economy unions 
sponsored by national centers (Mozambique), direct recruitment of informal economy workers into individual 
unions (Ghana), alliance building with ‘associations’ of informal economy workers (Zambia) and new unions 
of women workers (South Africa)” (Spooner 2004).  
Remi Ayiede explores interactions between labour unions and NGOs in the struggle against 
the military dictatorship in Nigeria. Despite weakening during the 1980s, by the 1990s labour 
unions had started to work with other civil society groups in the pursuit of common objectives, 
although these interactions remained informal (Remi Ayiede 2004). In her study on Zambia, 
Hedblom refers to unions in the context of ‘modern civil society’, arguing that this  ‘primarily 
concerns only the “bourgeois” labour, mostly with individualised and privatised interests’ 
(Hedblom, 2005, p.51). Paraphrasing Tornquist, she goes on to make that point that 
‘deepening democracy’ through a plurality of actors with competing interests may make it 
difficult for groups to promote their own interests – as the case of the Zambian labour 
movement illustrates.  As the context in which many trade unions in Africa is evolving, and 
unions attempt to adjust to these changing environments (e.g., Ghana – see Anyemedu 
2000), further research may be necessary to illuminate other key issues, challenges and 
potential opportunities for the labour movement in Africa. 
11. Business associations 
There are few studies that focus specifically on business associations (BAs) in Africa, and 
much existing evidence appears to be anecdotal and pessimistic regarding the potential for 
positive growth coalitions between business associations and government (Brautigam, 
Rakner and Taylor 2002). Early literature argued that business interest groups were 
dominated by short-term, rent seeking concerns, which made it difficult or impossible for 
businesses to act cohesively towards common goals (Brautigam, Rakner and Taylor 2002; 
Bates & Krueger 1993; Toye 1992). Losers often organised to resist reforms, and winners 
were tended to be more concerned with their own, rather than collective, interests. The 
weakness of the private sector, and pervasive dependence on the state, has made business 
communities in many parts of Africa subservient to the state and key social groups (i.e., the 
political and financial elites). Middle-class professionals and intellectuals who run key public 
institutions in this type of environment are often focussed on their own economic survival and 
reluctant to interfere with the state’s policies (Gyimah-Boadi 1996). Some analysts have 
argued `good, growth-enhancing relations between business and government elites are 
possible’ (Maxfield and Schneider 1997; Lucas 1997). Jon Kraus has published some 
interesting research comparing the activity and influence of business associations in Nigeria 
(very active and relatively influential) and Ghana (less active and influential), arguing that the 
state-business relationship is the basic factor that determines how influential BAs will be 
(Kraus 2002).  
With a few notable exceptions (including South Africa and Nigeria), the private sector in Africa 
tends to be weak (Goldstein 2000, Kraus 2002). Although business chambers for mining, 
commerce, and industry and employers' associations exist throughout Africa, some of them 
(particularly in Francophone Africa) are created and funded by the state. Moreover, BAs 
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political crises between the 1970s- late 1990’s. These crippled the African middle classes and 
their business associations, negatively impacting their membership rates and organisational 
capacity (Gyimah-Boadi 1996). Brautigam, Rakner and Taylor outline challenges to 
developing a dynamic and effective private sector in Africa, highlighting that building a local 
industrial base takes many decades in the best of circumstances.  
In Africa, few governments rely on local manufacturing as their political and social support 
base. Many economies are dominated by mining, petroleum, or other industrial commodity 
production. Others receive more income in foreign aid than in corporate or income taxes. The 
prolonged economic crisis and the resultant crises of governance have thwarted what might 
have been the slow but eventual development of an increasingly capable state and a growing 
business class. In many African countries (for example, Zambia) the private sector has 
remained a small part of the productive economy, which limits the lobbying effectiveness of 
business (Brautigam, Rakner and Taylor 2002). Business associations in Nigeria,
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other hand, have had high levels of activity and been able to influence public policies. Kraus 
attributes this to relatively high levels of economic liberalization and private sector expansion 
in Nigeria’s economy during the 1980s- 1990s, a pro-business ideology within the state, high 
degree of associational freedom, capable private press, legitimacy of representation accorded 
to BAs, large BA membership, and cooperation between different business associations in the 
country (Kraus 2002). 
Democratisation has also had a mixed effect on business in Africa. Brautigam, Rakner and 
Taylor’s study explores the prominence of business and relationships with government in 
three country case studies: Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mauritius. In Zambia, business–state 
relations did not improve despite a pro-democracy stance by business and the pro-business 
agenda of the democratic government coming to power in 1991. In Zimbabwe, the erosion of 
democracy reduced business access to state elites, breaking up a growth coalition that 
initially showed promise. In Mauritius, the strengthening of democracy has paralleled the 
deepening of the growth coalition, and both have been reinforced by a strong economy. The 
study argues that the key to growth coalitions in Africa lies in determining the conditions under 
which such coalitions can be sustained in Africa's fragile polities (Brautigam, Rakner and 
Taylor 2002). Kraus identifies key factors that determine the strength, activity levels and 
influence of business associations: levels of capitalist development; strength and autonomy of 
capitalist classes and institutions in relation to the state; strength of capitalist ideology in 
relation to statist or socialist ideologies; democratic or authoritarian characteristics of the 
political system; and influence of external actors such as the IMF, World Bank and western 
donor governments who are often catalysts for the development of business associations in 
Africa (Kraus 2002). 
‘Growth coalitions’, involving business interest groups and governments, are largely non-
existent in Africa (Bräutigam, Rakner and Taylor, 2002). In some cases, businesses avoid 
confrontation with the state or involvement in politics. Afraid of damaging their ‘cronyist 
relationship’ with government, and concerned with their own basic survival, they engage in 
behind-the-scenes lobbying on behalf of their own narrowly defined interests. With the partial 
exception of Zambia, there is little evidence that the business elite in any African country has 
played a decisive role in democratisation. Although many middle-class professional bodies 
(including bar, medical, and university faculty associations) are cohesively organised and 
characterised by internal democracy, they have been weakened by the economic and political 
crises that have hit many African countries since the late 1970s (Gyimah-Boadi 1996). Given 
state dominance in so much of the formal sector of African economies - especially in the 
areas of investment and employment - the private sector is often dependent on government 
for employment, contracts, subsidised credit and protection from foreign competition. As a 
result, the basis for individual and associational autonomy is extremely weak and the private 
sector remains vulnerable to state pressure. In Ghana in the late 1970s, for example, 
associations of public servants, doctors, and lawyers were active in the popular movement 
demanding an end to military rule and authoritarianism until the ruling military council 
                                                       
54 These include the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Manufacturing and Agriculture; the 
Manufacturing Association of Nigeria; and Nigerian Economic Summit.   36
threatened the government employees among them with dismissal and ordered them to 
vacate their government-provided homes. As a result, Ghanaian professional bodies were 
reluctant to actively participate in the pro-democracy movement of the early 1990s (Gyimah-
Boadi 1996). 
12.  Gaps in the research 
In the course of this literature review we have been able to identify what appear to be gaps in 
the body of knowledge about elites and institutions in Africa. Here, in summary form, we 
identify some of the more significant ones (in no particular order of importance): 
   Lack of reliable data is a recurring theme in the literature (and a well known issue). This 
includes reliable time series data of all kinds, accurate and up to date government 
statistics (for example fiscal data), household or community survey data.
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   On elites, there is one overriding question: Are the structural ties that link elites to their 
national populations consistently weaker in developing countries than in ‘historical 
Europe’? (Moore and Hossain 2005). Or are they better hidden, i.e. under-researched? 
(Bratton 2006) 
   More generally, the questions about elites posed in the review merit further research 
attention, namely: Are new elites emerging? Is there a deepening of the elites (to 
include, for example, other ethnic groups, or women, or the private sector, etc)? What 
impact does ethnic heterogeneity have on elites? Are there elite linkages across 
institutions? 
   Investigation into how ‘pro-poor’ developing country elites are could provide interesting 
and useful insights. There are very good reasons to believe that elites could play a 
greater role in framing and supporting policies that would be pro-poor if they were 
engaged in a more constructive and sympathetic way by aid donors or other external 
agents (Hossain and Moore 2002). 
   What are the measurable outcomes (as opposed to the processes) of the last 15 years 
of democratisation in Africa? There is an almost exclusive focus on processes in the 
literature. For example, will electoral competition have a bigger effect on education 
spending where electors do not vote primarily on ethno-regional lines? (Stasavage 
2005) 
   What is the role of sub-national units? Little is know about local politics, local elections, 
local administrations, nor of the people that make up these institutions. And little is 
known about the impacts of decentralisation. 
   The literature on non-state institutions in Africa – whether media, civil society, women’s 
movements, trades unions or business associations - invariably excludes any 
discussion of neopatrimonialism. This strikes us as a serious omission. 
   What are the implications of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on elites and institutions in Africa? 
A key starting point for examining this question is the work of de Walle (2003).
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   Whilst there is a substantial literature on the ‘brain drain’, little is known about the elite 
diaspora. Most African PhDs, medical doctors, lawyers, and so on are abroad. Little is 
known about their influence on politics and democratisation, or whether they will come 
back. 
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56  He frames the problem thus: “The development of the pandemic defects the stability of the governing elite. All 
countries are run by a relatively small group of people who dominate government, party, army, business and civil 
society … One of the challenges facing many African countries is how to ensure a smooth transition from a relatively 
closed elite … to a more institutionalized and pluralistic system with wider access. The HIV/AIDS pandemic has 
several consequences. It erodes the institutionalization of the government and accelerates the need to replenish this 
elite. As noted, this affects patrimonial structures as well as rational-legal ones. Men and women who have decades 
of political experience, strong networks and respected judgment, are being lost, and younger cadres are being 
promoted to fill the posts, but cannot fill the structural gap … the most probable scenario is that those in power rely 
more heavily on a smaller circle of loyal comrades, and use more ruthless or corrupt methods to co-opt or buy 
support.” (van de Walle 2003).   37
   What is the impact of international donor aid on elites and politics in Africa? This is not 
a neutral concern. What has been the result to date of aid flows to support legislatures 
or rule of law projects, of a reliance on foreign experts, and all the other inputs that 
donors make to Africa? 
   There is, in fact, little direct research about the relationship of elites to political 
institutions (and how this is mediated by financial and business concerns) beyond the 
following ‘knowns’: 1) Political positions (whether MPs or civil servants) are invariably 
made up of professionals (lawyers, academics, higher civil servants – not direct wealth 
creators, though frequently involved in entrepreneurial activities on the side); 2) The 
entrepreneurial class is poorly represented in politics; 3) Rent seeking behaviour by 
business class is common; 4) The use of formal institutions (e.g. business 
associations) to lobby policy makers is part of this rent seeking. Does democratisation 
tend to divide elites, for example, by pitching them in competitions for electoral support, 
and by changing the political logic from assembling as large a majority as possible (the 
logic of the old single party regimes), to legitimating rule by the smallest possible 
winning coalition? 
   Despite the overriding importance of ethnicity, little is known about “how ethnicity does 
what it does” (Milanovic 2005 p. 35). Whilst there are sets of measurable variables for, 
say, democracy,
57 none such exist for ethnicity. 
   On civil society organisations, a number of critical areas remain under-researched. To 
identify a few: 1) Relatively little is known about their effectiveness and impact, 
particularly in the policy making sphere (Robinson and Friedman 2005, Chowdhury, 
Finlay-Notman and Hovland 2006, Court and Maxwell 2006). 2) Further exploration of 
the role that elites play in civil society is needed. Does the emergence of an active civil 
society result in a renewal of voices – and a new way of thinking - in the policy process 
or is this simply another vehicle for elites to exercise their power? 3) How do NGOs and 
CSOs use (or abuse or ignore) evidence in attempts to influence policy processes 
(Pollard and Court 2005)? 
   Does creating space for women’s voices give rise to new women’s voices, or does this 
space in turn become dominated by elites? 
   Other areas for research on gender relations include: the differential impact of levels of 
civil and political liberties, donor and foreign influences, educational levels of women, 
elite divisions, regional variance and networks (and other factors that might result in 
differing levels of associational autonomy and challenges to clientelism), and whether 
the emergence of women’s movements are indeed presenting new opportunities for 
non-elites to articulate their issues and concerns (as the general assumption seems to 
be) or whether these spaces are being taken over by the elites. 
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